James Smith, Sr. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 880 F.3d 1272

Background

James Smith, Sr. sued R.J. Reynolds in an Engle-progeny wrongful-death action after his wife Wanette Smith died of tobacco-related disease; claims included negligence/strict liability and intentional torts (fraudulent concealment, conspiracy).
The jury found for Smith on all claims, assessed compensatory damages of $600,000 and punitive damages of $20,000, and allocated fault: 55% to R.J. Reynolds, 45% to Mrs. Smith.
Florida law (Fla. Stat. § 768.81) reduces damages in negligence/products-liability suits by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault but excludes actions based on intentional torts.
The district court instructed the jury (per defendant’s requested instruction) that the jury’s percentage allocation would reduce the damages; after the verdict the court declined to reduce the award because the jury had found liability on intentional tort claims.
Defendant argued (1) Florida law required reduction across claims despite the intentional-tort findings, or (2) Smith waived the intentional-tort exception by urging the jury to apportion fault and accepting the instruction; alternatively, defendant argued the court was bound by its own instruction.
The district court followed the Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling (Schoeff) that an Engle case in which the jury finds for plaintiff on an intentional-tort claim bars reduction of compensatory damages under the comparative-fault statute unless the plaintiff waived that exception; the court found no waiver and refused to reduce damages.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether compensatory damages must be reduced by plaintiff’s percentage of fault when jury finds liability on intentional tort claims as well as negligence claims	Smith: Florida’s comparative-fault statute does not apply to actions where plaintiff prevailed on intentional tort claims, so damages should not be reduced	R.J. Reynolds: Even with intentional-tort claims, the statute applies so compensatory damages must be proportionately reduced	Held: Affirmed plaintiff — Florida Supreme Court precedent (Schoeff) bars reduction when jury finds for plaintiff on intentional torts unless waived
Whether Smith waived the intentional-tort exception by arguing the jury should apportion fault and accepting an instruction that damages would be reduced	Smith: He consistently opposed apportionment application to intentional torts, sought an instruction warning reduction might not apply, and did not knowingly relinquish the right	R.J. Reynolds: By arguing apportionment and accepting/verbalizing fault to jury, Smith intentionally relinquished the right to avoid reduction	Held: No waiver — district court didn’t abuse discretion in finding no voluntary, intentional relinquishment of known right
Whether the district court’s incorrect instruction (that damages would be reduced by the jury’s apportionment) requires reducing damages or other relief	Smith: Defendant requested the instruction; any error favors at most a new trial on damages, not a retroactive reduction that violates Florida law	R.J. Reynolds: Court should honor its instruction and reduce damages per jury apportionment	Held: Instruction was incorrect but defendant requested it; retroactive reduction would violate Florida law and is not an appropriate remedy; at most defendant could have sought a new trial, which it did not request
Appropriate remedy for post-verdict renunciation of an instruction requested by the defendant	Smith: No relief for defendant; reduction would contravene Florida law and defendant prompted the instruction	R.J. Reynolds: Entitled to enforcement of the instruction it obtained from the court	Held: No reduction; defendant’s remedy would have been a new trial on damages, which it did not seek; affirm district court

Key Cases Cited

McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir.) (review of state-law interpretation is de novo)
Proctor v. Fluor Enter., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir.) (standard for reviewing waiver and prejudice analysis)
Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir.) (definition of waiver as voluntary, intentional relinquishment)
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (U.S.) (waiver requires knowing and intelligent relinquishment)
Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (background and preclusive effects of Engle class findings)
Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.) (Engle-progeny precedent cited concerning due-process argument)
Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (post-briefing reexamination of Walker)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hiott, 129 So.3d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (district court decision discussing waiver by plaintiff under certain facts)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sury, 118 So.3d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (district court decision finding no waiver where plaintiff preserved objection)
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (procedural history of Engle progeny litigation)