James Reynolds v. Daniel M. Tangherlini
737 F.3d 1093
7th Cir.2013Background
- James Reynolds, a 62-year-old GSA employee with ~30 years’ service, was passed over for a Building Manager promotion in 2005 in favor of a 32-year-old, Antoine Bell. The decisionmaker, Kenneth Kipnis, reviewed résumés and relied on prior knowledge; no candidates were interviewed.
- Reynolds filed an administrative complaint alleging age, race, and sex discrimination and generalized "harassment;" the EEO office declined to investigate the harassment/retaliation allegations for lack of factual detail and disposed of the discrimination claims; EEOC affirmed.
- Reynolds sued the GSA Administrator under the federal-sector ADEA (29 U.S.C. § 633a) for age discrimination and hostile work environment, Title VII for race/sex discrimination, and retaliation under both statutes. The district court granted summary judgment on retaliation claims for failure to exhaust and Reynolds dropped race/sex claims.
- A three-day bench trial on the age-discrimination claim produced findings crediting Kipnis’s testimony that interpersonal fit and prior teamwork (Bell’s membership on the transition team) drove the promotion decision; the district court found Reynolds failed to prove causation under both but-for and motivating-factor standards.
- Reynolds moved during trial to amend to add Rehabilitation Act and Whistleblower Act retaliation claims based on trial testimony; the district court denied amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Judgment for the Administrator was entered and Reynolds appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reynolds exhausted administrative remedies for Title VII retaliation | Reynolds contends his administrative "harassment" charge preserved retaliation claims | GSA says harassment allegations lacked factual specificity and did not put agency on notice of Title VII retaliation | Court: No exhaustion; Title VII retaliation claims dismissed |
| Whether Reynolds exhausted administrative remedies for ADEA retaliation | Reynolds argues administrative filing sufficed | GSA says Reynolds did not provide EEOC notice under § 633a(d) and did not exhaust administrative route | Court: No exhaustion via § 633a(d) or administrative route; ADEA retaliation dismissed |
| Causation standard for federal-sector ADEA (29 U.S.C. § 633a): but-for vs. motivating-factor | Reynolds: § 633a’s language permits motivating-factor/mixed-motives liability (any discrimination forbidden) | GSA: outcome unaffected; alternative findings defeat claim regardless of standard | Court: Declined to decide that novel circuit question; affirmed on alternative findings that Reynolds failed under either standard |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying Rule 15(b) amendments to add Rehabilitation Act or Whistleblower claims | Reynolds: Trial evidence (Kipnis’s ADA-related testimony; past complaints) amounted to implied consent to try new claims | GSA: No consent; amendments would be prejudicial and outside scope of pleaded issues | Court: Denial not an abuse of discretion; amendment would prejudice defendant and claims were outside pleaded scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (federal-sector ADEA may permit motivating-factor liability)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (private-sector ADEA requires but-for causation)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Bohac v. West, 85 F.3d 306 (7th Cir. 1996) (ADEA federal-employee procedures and EEOC notice interpretation)
- Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2012) (applies but-for causation to federal-sector ADEA claims)