151 A.3d 20
Me.2016Background
- In 2009 Levis sued to quiet title and claim ~125x100 ft of mudflat by adverse possession; last recorded owner was J. Henry Cartland (1890). He named Cartland’s heirs (served by publication) and abutter Konitzky (initially as party in interest).
- Default judgment entered against the unknown Cartland heirs in Oct. 2009; order said it did not affect Konitzky.
- Konitzky later located alleged heirs who conveyed their interests to him and moved to set aside the default; the court vacated the default in 2011 and allowed him to appear as an assignee/defendant.
- Years of procedural dispute and extended discovery followed; in Dec. 2013 the court allowed Konitzky to file a late motion for summary judgment, which the court granted in March 2014, concluding Levis failed to establish adverse possession, title by deed, or a statutory quiet-title showing.
- Levis’s subsequent motions for default against remaining heirs were denied in 2015; the court held the summary judgment resolved that Levis did not have title, and a default against the heirs would be inconsistent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court abused discretion in vacating the 2009 default against Cartland heirs | Levis argued default should stand and unknown heirs remained bound | Konitzky showed discovery of heir and recorded conveyances making him an assignee; default not final as to all parties | Court did not abuse discretion in vacating default because default was not a final judgment and assignee status warranted further proceedings |
| Whether the court abused discretion by denying Levis’s 2011 default motion against Konitzky | Levis said Konitzky failed to comply with rules and deadlines, meriting default | Konitzky had timely appearance as assignee and contested merits; procedural extensions applied | Denial upheld; court reasonably exercised discretion in declining default |
| Whether the court abused discretion by allowing a late motion for summary judgment (Dec. 2013) | Levis argued Rule 6(b) requires excusable neglect to permit late dispositive motion and court erred by granting leave before Levis could respond | Konitzky and court relied on M.R. Civ. P. 56(b) (motion may be filed at any time so long as it does not delay trial) and on lengthy, irregular scheduling and ongoing discovery | Court acted within discretion: Rule 56(b) permits late summary judgment if it won’t delay trial; no prejudice shown and opposition was considered |
| Whether summary judgment for Konitzky was proper on adverse possession, deed claim, and quiet-title claims | Levis claimed adverse possession and title via 2008 quitclaim from ex-wife; asserted statutory quiet-title eligibility | Konitzky showed continuous use since 2002 (undermining exclusivity/continuity), public easement over intertidal zone limits adverse-possession claim, and Levis lacked evidentiary chain for deed or quiet-title statutory elements | Summary judgment affirmed: Levis failed to make prima facie showing for adverse possession, deed-based title, or statutory quiet title; no genuine issue of material fact |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (U.S. 1990) (excusable-neglect standard applies to late filings in the summary judgment context)
- Johnson v. Carleton, 765 A.2d 571 (Me. 2001) (trial court discretion in enlarging time; deference to trial court)
- Dalton v. Quinn, 8 A.3d 670 (Me. 2010) (deference to trial court on scheduling/enlargement requests)
- Dombkowski v. Ferland, 893 A.2d 599 (Me. 2006) (elements required to establish adverse possession)
- Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (public easement across intertidal zone for fishing, fowling, navigation)
- Rancourt v. Waterville Osteopathic Hosp., 526 A.2d 1385 (Me. 1987) (summary judgment as a tool to effectuate judicial economy)