James Lyall v. City of Los Angeles
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21055
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- On Nov. 16, 2008, ~100 people attended a widely publicized fundraising musical/art event in a downtown Los Angeles warehouse subleased by Josh Haglund. Organizers included plaintiffs Javier Cortez and Elizabeth Lopez.
- LAPD officers responding to a nearby beer-theft call located a pickup near the warehouse, observed people entering in clothing matching the radio description, and approached the warehouse.
- Cortez, standing at the half-open door, told officers they needed a warrant; he then ran into the warehouse, struggled with officers, and was arrested for resisting. Officers then entered the warehouse, detained attendees against a fence, conducted pat‑down searches and a field show‑up; one person was identified and arrested.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourth and First Amendment violations and a state Bane Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on warrantless‑entry claims for most plaintiffs (no standing) and barred Cortez’s unreasonable‑seizure claim under Heck; remaining claims went to jury, which ruled for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed most rulings but reversed summary judgment on warrantless‑entry claims for Cortez and Lopez (organizers), holding they had possessory interests sufficient for Fourth Amendment standing and remanding those claims for trial; it affirmed the Heck bar as to Cortez’s unreasonable‑seizure claim and rejected plaintiffs’ jury‑instruction challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge officers’ warrantless entry | Organizers (Cortez, Lopez) and some others had possessory rights or expectations of privacy in the warehouse and thus can challenge the entry | Most plaintiffs were mere attendees with no possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy; no standing | Organizers Cortez and Lopez have Fourth Amendment standing under property/trespass theory; attendees and Holliday do not (summary judgment affirmed for them) |
| Appropriate Fourth Amendment test post‑Jones | Plaintiffs argued Katz reasonable‑expectation test applies; trespass theory also protects possessory interests | Defendants relied on lack of expectation of privacy for attendees to defeat standing | Court applied Jones: trespassory (property/possessory) test and Katz are distinct; possessory interest can confer standing even absent expectation of privacy |
| Exigent circumstances as justification for warrantless entry | Entry was not justified by exigent circumstances given minor offense and disputed facts | Entry was necessary to investigate theft and secure officers | Question of exigency is factual for jury; court could not decide exigency as matter of law — remand for trial as to Cortez/Lopez claims |
| Application of Heck to Cortez’s § 1983 unreasonable‑seizure claim | Cortez argued short custody made habeas unavailable, so Heck should not bar his § 1983 claim | Defendants argued Cortez’s conviction was intact and Heck bars claims that would imply its invalidity | Heck bar applies: Cortez failed to pursue California direct appeal; his § 1983 claim is barred because success would undermine the outstanding conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim barred when success would imply invalidity of an outstanding conviction)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable‑expectation‑of‑privacy test)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (trespass/property theory: physical occupation of property to obtain information is a Fourth Amendment search)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing requires more than mere presence on premises searched)
- Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal; only the aggrieved person may challenge a search)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (standards for stop-and-frisk based on reasonable suspicion)
- Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (presence at scene alone does not justify individualized search or seizure)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (application of Jones property reasoning to curtilage and investigative methods)
- Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (Fourth Amendment protects property as well as privacy)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (limits and discussion of Heck; some Justices suggested Heck’s scope may be narrower for former prisoners)
- United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) (possession/permission analysis informing standing)
- Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (narrow post‑Spencer exception to Heck for brief custodial matters)
- Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2006) (failure to pursue available habeas relief may leave plaintiff subject to Heck bar)