James King v. United States
917 F.3d 409
| 6th Cir. | 2019Background
- On July 18, 2014, two plainclothes officers (one Grand Rapids detective detailed to an FBI task force and one FBI special agent) sought a fugitive, Aaron Davison, and encountered James King, a 21‑year‑old white male who matched a broad physical description of Davison.
- Officers approached King near (but several blocks from) the gas station Davison frequented; dispute exists whether officers identified themselves as police.
- Officers instructed King to face a vehicle and put his hands on his head, frisked him, removed his pocketknife and then his wallet; King attempted to flee, was tackled, choked, lost consciousness, bit an officer, and was then repeatedly struck.
- Bystander video of the assault was not preserved; King received emergency treatment, was jailed and later acquitted at trial of related charges.
- King sued asserting Fourth Amendment claims (unreasonable seizure and excessive force) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or, as to the federal agent, Bivens; the district court dismissed the FTCA claim against the United States for lack of jurisdiction and granted qualified immunity to the officers.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the merits: it held the FTCA judgment‑bar did not preclude King’s claims against the officers and concluded disputed facts precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity for both the stop/search and excessive‑force claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the FTCA judgment bar (28 U.S.C. § 2676) precludes King’s Bivens/§ 1983 claims | FTCA dismissal was for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, so § 2676 does not bar individual‑capacity claims | The district court’s dismissal of the FTCA claim (applying Michigan immunity) constitutes a § 1346(b) judgment that triggers the FTCA judgment bar | Reversed district court: FTCA dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction under Meyer, so § 2676 does not bar King’s claims (Himmelreich and related authority controlling) |
| Whether the initial encounter / investigative stop was lawful (reasonable suspicion) | Officers lacked particularized reasonable suspicion: vague description, remote location, no evidence King bought a drink, disputed resemblance to old photo | Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain King as possibly Davison based on physical description, location/time, and photos | Reversed: credibility/factual disputes (especially similarity to photos and whether officers identified themselves) preclude summary judgment; reasonable suspicion is a jury question |
| Whether the frisk and removal of King’s wallet was lawful | Frisk went beyond weapons search: officer removed wallet though nothing made officer reasonably suspect it was a weapon | Officer argues concern about concealed weapons and officer safety justified search/seizure of pocket contents | Reversed: removing the wallet exceeded Terry/pat‑down/‘plain‑touch’ limits absent particularized facts making its incriminating or weapon‑like nature immediately apparent |
| Whether the use of force (tackling, chokehold, punches) is shielded by qualified immunity | Force was excessive and included chokehold/deadly force; officers failed to identify themselves so flight was reasonable; disputed whether King remained resisting when beaten | Officers argue split‑second decisions, need to stop flight and secure scene; force was reasonable given resistance and safety concerns | Reversed: factual disputes (including identification, whether King was subdued) preclude qualified immunity; chokehold and continued beating after subduing would be clearly excessive under established law |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implied cause of action against federal officers for constitutional violations)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) (mistaken identity arrests doctrine)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry stop/frisk framework)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective‑reasonableness standard for excessive force)
- Meyer v. United States, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (FTCA waiver/jurisdictional limits)
- Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 1843 (2016) (interpretation of FTCA judgment bar and exceptions)
- Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 766 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2014) (FTCA dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not trigger § 2676)
- Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (reasonable‑suspicion requires particularized, articulable facts)