James Frye v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc, 495 F. App'x 669

Frye, an ICU Step Down nurse, worked for Baptist Memorial Hospital system from 2004 to April 19, 2007.
Baptist Memorial operates three Tennessee hospitals with independent HR functions but a systemwide HR director.
Frye claimed Baptist Memorial’s automatic-deduction policy for lunch breaks violated the FLSA’s pay-for-all-time requirement.
District court initially conditionally certified then decertified the collective action after discovery due to lack of similarly situated plaintiffs.
District court found no common FLSA injury and held Frye failed to show Baptist Memorial trained/monitored the policy; summary judgment granted on statute-of-limitations grounds for missing written consent.
On appeal, Frye challenges decertification and the written-consent requirement; Baptist Memorial defends based on FLSA text and case law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused its discretion in decertifying	Frye argues common FLSA injury shown; burden-shifting demonstrates similarly situated opt-ins.	Baptist Memorial contends substantial differences in duties and procedures defeat similarity.	No abuse; decertification affirmed.
Whether plaintiffs must file written consent to join the collective action for statute of limitations	Named plaintiffs may not be required to file written consents.	§ 256 requires written consent to commence collective actions for statute purposes.	Written consent required; Frye failed to file within limitations.
Whether decertification converted the action into an individual claim	Decertification altered proceedings to individual claims exempting consent rule.	Decertification does not erase class action status; consent rule still applies.	Decertification did not excuse consent requirement; action remains governed by § 256.
Whether estoppel or other exceptions save Frye’s claim from the written-consent requirement	Baptist Memorial’s handling of consents estops it from objecting.	No authority supports estoppel; consent requirement remains enforceable.	No estoppel; consent requirement applies.

O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., 575 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (two-stage FLSA certification; leading factors for similarly situated inquiry)
Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006) (second-stage standard stricter; informs similarly situated standard)
Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007) (common theory of FLSA violation supports similarity)
Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2011) (employer cannot evade liability; burden on employer to track hours)
Brennan v. Qwest Communications International, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Minn. 2010) (burden to maintain records; evidence not showing blanket exemption)
Wood v. Mid-America Management Corp., 192 F. App’x 378 (6th Cir. 2006) (employer cannot compensate for hours employee knew about but did not report)
Lee v. Vance Exec. Prot., Inc., 7 F. App’x 160 (4th Cir. 2001) (supporting use of written consents in commencement)
Kuhn v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 487 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (written-consent rules apply to representative actions)
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (U.S. 1981) (form of consent considerations; understanding of writing requirement)