James Farris v. County of Antrim, 329816

Background

In 2010 a child protective proceeding led to termination of James Farris’s parental rights; after appeal and remand (In re Sanders), the petition was dismissed and the child returned to Farris.
Farris had been represented initially by retained counsel Gerald Charland, who was later court‑appointed when Farris could not pay; Charland withdrew and Ross Hickman was later appointed.
Farris sued Charland and Hickman for malpractice in Grand Traverse Circuit Court and obtained judgments; both attorneys lacked malpractice insurance while representing Farris.
Farris then sued Antrim County and Family Division Court Administrator William Hefferan, alleging (1) Hefferan was grossly negligent in failing to require proof of malpractice insurance from court‑appointed attorneys and (2) the county was liable as a third‑party beneficiary or under respondeat superior for appointed counsel.
Defendants moved for summary disposition asserting governmental immunity, that the county merely pays statutorily mandated fees (no contract or supervisory role), and that Hefferan’s conduct at most showed ordinary negligence and was not the proximate cause of Farris’s injuries.
The circuit court granted summary disposition; on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (a) Hefferan’s conduct did not rise to gross negligence nor proximately cause the harm, and (b) no contract existed making Farris a third‑party beneficiary of any agreement between county and attorneys.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hefferan committed gross negligence such that governmental immunity is inapplicable	Hefferan systematically failed to implement the malpractice‑insurance practice, showing substantial lack of concern and gross negligence	Hefferan at most made isolated administrative errors; any omission was ordinary negligence and not discretionary misconduct	Held: No. Evidence showed isolated failures, not conduct "so reckless" to be gross negligence; immunity applies
Whether Hefferan's omission was the proximate cause of Farris’s injury	Failure to secure proof of insurance made counsel effectively uninsured and diminished Farris’s recovery from malpractice	The proximate cause of Farris’s harm was the attorneys’ malpractice and lack of insurance, not Hefferan’s administrative omission	Held: No. The direct, efficient cause was counsel’s malpractice; Hefferan’s omission did not proximately cause the injury
Whether a contract existed between Antrim County and appointed attorneys creating third‑party beneficiary rights for Farris	County’s promise to pay appointed counsel creates a contractual relationship; Farris is a third‑party beneficiary entitled to enforce duties (e.g., insurance requirement)	Appointment and supervision are judicial functions; county’s duty is statutory to pay fees, not contractual supervision or hiring; no contract exists	Held: No. No express or enforceable contract between county and attorneys; county’s role was statutory payment, so no third‑party beneficiary claim
Whether county is vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for appointed counsel	Appointed attorneys acted as ostensible or actual agents of the county, making the county responsible for their acts	County does not appoint, supervise, or employ counsel; it only pays fee per statute and administrative order delegates appointment/supervision to the judge	Held: Abandoned on appeal and rejected by lower court; no basis for vicarious liability absent employment/contractual relationship

Key Cases Cited

In re Sanders, 495 Mich. 394 (Mich. 2014) (standard for remand in child protective proceedings)
In re Farris, 497 Mich. 959 (Mich. 2015) (Supreme Court action arising from the same underlying case)
Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (Mich. 2008) (standard of review for summary disposition and discussion of governmental immunity)
Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109 (Mich. 1999) (gross negligence requires more than ordinary negligence)
Tarlea v. Crabtree, 263 Mich. App. 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (definition and character of gross negligence)
Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439 (Mich. 2000) (defines proximate cause as the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause)
In re Osborne, 459 Mich. 360 (Mich. 1999) (examples of counties contracting with attorneys for indigent representation)
In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178 (Mich. 1978) (discussing contracts and appointment of substitute counsel)
In re Attorney Fees of Klevorn (People v. Koschiecha), 185 Mich. App. 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (county contract examples for indigent defense appointments)