55 N.E.3d 354
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 2007 a jury convicted James E. Saylor of two counts of Class A child molesting, one count of Class B vicarious sexual gratification, and intimidation; the trial was bifurcated with a separate habitual-offender phase. Saylor received an aggregate 138-year sentence.
- At trial, the victim B.D. (then ~11–12) and other witnesses testified; a forensic nurse described healed vaginal tear and hymenal thinning consistent with penetration.
- During closing, defense counsel argued alternative sources for the medical findings and twice suggested other people had sexual contact with B.D.; at one point he said, “Mr. Saylor was not the only person that was having sex with [B.D.].”
- While the jury was waiting to begin the habitual-offender phase, defense counsel told the court Saylor would plead guilty to the habitual-offender enhancement; the plea was entered without a personal, on-the-record waiver of jury trial by Saylor.
- Saylor sought post-conviction relief arguing (inter alia) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to certain matters and for counsel’s alleged admission of guilt in closing, and that his guilty plea to the habitual-offender charge was not knowing/voluntary because he did not personally waive jury trial. The post-conviction court denied relief; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Saylor) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Trial court failed to administer a proper oath to child witness | The court’s colloquy did not bind B.D.’s conscience; counsel was ineffective for not objecting | The court’s child‑appropriate colloquy satisfied Rule 603 and competency inquiries; objection would not have been sustained | No ineffective assistance; judge’s oath/competency colloquy was adequate |
| 2. Prosecutor impermissibly vouched in closing; counsel ineffective for not objecting | Numerous prosecutor statements improperly vouched for witnesses’ credibility | Prosecutor’s credibility arguments were grounded in the trial evidence and permissible inferences | No ineffective assistance; statements were proper commentary on evidence |
| 3. Defense counsel admitted Saylor’s guilt during closing | Counsel’s remark that Saylor “was not the only person” having sex with B.D. amounted to a judicial admission nullifying jury’s role | The remark was an inadvertent, isolated mistake within a continued theory of innocence and was not a binding judicial admission; State did not exploit it | No ineffective assistance; not a judicial admission and, given overwhelming evidence, no prejudice shown |
| 4. Personal waiver requirement for jury when pleading guilty to habitual-offender enhancement | Saylor did not personally waive jury trial; counsel’s statement pleading guilty is insufficient, so plea was not knowing/voluntary | The plea statutes differ but personal waiver is unnecessary or was implied by circumstances | Vacated habitual-offender adjudication and remanded: personal waiver required for jury right when pleading guilty; Saylor did not personally waive |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing the two‑prong ineffective assistance test)
- McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. 2002) (discussing prejudice standard under Strickland)
- Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007) (failure‑to‑object ineffective‑assistance framework)
- Collins v. State, 366 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (attorney statements in argument are not judicial admissions if inadvertent or unguarded)
- Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 2001) (post‑conviction scope and limits)
- Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. 2002) (post‑conviction burden of proof and review)