James E. Kochanski v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC
850 N.W.2d 160
Wis.2014Background
- On Feb. 6, 2007, James Kochanski slipped/tripped on snow outside a Speedway store, breaking his arm; surveillance video captured the fall.
- Kochanski sued for common-law negligence and under Wisconsin’s safe-place statute (Wis. Stat. § 101.11).
- Discovery revealed five former Speedway employees who were on duty at the time; Speedway did not call any former or current store employees at trial and relied principally on the surveillance video.
- The trial court gave Wis JI — Civil 410 (absent-witness instruction) at Kochanski’s request; plaintiff emphasized the instruction in closing.
- The jury returned a plaintiff verdict (~$317,545); the circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court on the jury-instruction ground and remanded for a new trial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the absent-witness instruction (Wis JI — Civil 410) was proper | The absence of Speedway’s (former/current) employees who had knowledge of snow‑removal/salting justified the inference that their testimony would be unfavorable | The instruction was improper because the uncalled witnesses were not shown to be material, were not peculiarly within Speedway’s control, and their testimony would be cumulative of the video | Instruction was erroneously given — record lacked factual foundation of materiality, control/“more natural” calling, and reasonable basis for a negative inference |
| Whether the erroneous instruction was prejudicial | The jury could properly weigh the inference along with other evidence to find notice and liability | The instruction allowed plaintiff to supply an essential element (notice) by inference rather than evidence, unfairly prejudicing Speedway | Prejudicial — the inference likely supplied the necessary proof of constructive notice for the safe‑place claim, requiring reversal and a new trial |
| Whether plaintiff proved notice (actual or constructive) required for a safe-place violation | The surveillance video, testimony about post-fall salting, and the instruction supported a finding that Speedway had notice | Video did not show how long the condition existed; plaintiff produced no evidence of Speedway’s methods/processes or that they were not followed | On the record (absent the improper inference) plaintiff failed to prove notice — no evidence of duration or of processes creating the hazard, so the instruction materially affected the verdict |
| Proper scope/use of the missing-witness inference | Inference is permissible when facts show a particular witness is material, peculiarly within a party’s control or more natural for that party to call, and the failure to call reasonably suggests concealment | Courts must not presume materiality or control; modern discovery lessens need for broad application; instruction should be sparingly given | Reiterated rule: instruction is a permissible inference (not a presumption) but may be given only when factual record supports materiality, control/“more natural” calling, and a reasonable basis for a negative inference |
Key Cases Cited
- Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893) (formative statement of the missing‑witness inference)
- Ballard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601 (1967) (explains limits on absent‑witness instruction and need for record foundation)
- Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231 (1972) (materiality and availability must be shown; cannot assume passenger saw accident)
- Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, Inc., 274 Wis. 2d 162 (2004) (constructive notice in safe‑place cases generally requires evidence on duration or that methods/processes create the hazard)
- Paulsen Lumber, Inc. v. Anderson, 91 Wis. 2d 692 (1979) (missing‑witness inference cannot supply an element of proof for plaintiff’s prima facie case)
- Booth v. Frankenstein, 209 Wis. 362 (1932) (absent‑witness instruction describes a permissible inference, not a presumption)
