James Dominic Stevenson v. State of Tennessee, M2020-00134-CCA-R3-PC

Background

Stevenson was convicted by a jury of attempted first-degree murder, merged aggravated assaults, and reckless endangerment for shooting his ex-girlfriend in her car (victim identified him); he received an effective 27-year sentence.
At trial the State presented physical evidence (casings, blood spatter, medical testimony of a jaw gunshot) and the victim’s positive in-court ID; defense argued identity doubt based on cellphone text/call inconsistencies.
Trial counsel: reviewed discovery, cross-examined the victim, introduced text messages, subpoenaed carrier records (did not request LOCATION-service detail or DNA/ballistics testing), and pursued a strategy focusing on lack of an agreed meeting place; counsel declined deeper attacks on the victim’s credibility to avoid alienating the jury.
Post-conviction petition raised 21 claims including failures to obtain DNA testing, cell-location records and experts, interview the victim, investigate third-party threats, and develop/retain experts for defenses.
At the post-conviction hearing counsel testified his choices were strategic, some avenues were blocked at trial, and Stevenson sometimes instructed counsel not to pursue alibi; no experts or external evidence were produced at the hearing to show what additional testing or investigation would have yielded.
The post-conviction court denied relief on all claims, finding Stevenson failed to prove either deficient performance or prejudice; Stevenson appealed and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Stevenson)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Failure to obtain DNA testing of victim's phone	Counsel should have tested the phone to exclude Stevenson as shooter	Counsel reasonably declined because phone exposure made DNA unlikely; no proof of what testing would show	Denied — no prejudice shown (no evidence what testing would have revealed)
Failure to obtain cell-location records / expert on time zone	Counsel failed to get/interpret location records and retain an expert to show alibi or timing errors	Counsel subpoenaed carrier records; petitioner produced no proof of what records would show; time-zone expert claim waived on appeal	Denied — no prejudice and time-zone expert issue waived
Failure to interview the victim before trial	Counsel should have interviewed the victim to identify impeachment or inconsistencies	Counsel relied on preliminary-hearing testimony, used it for cross-examination, and strategically avoided further questioning	Denied — no deficiency or resulting prejudice established
Failure to investigate third-party threats to victim	Counsel should have investigated reported threats (credit-card owner or others) that could show alternate suspect/motive	Counsel attempted to elicit threat evidence at trial; judge sustained objection; no post-conviction proof what further investigation would have shown	Denied — no prejudice shown
Failure to investigate defenses / retain experts generally	Counsel failed to develop alibi, pursue testing, or retain any experts	Many claimed avenues were either strategic, declined by Stevenson (alibi), or lacked any post-conviction proof of useful expert evidence	Denied — petitioner did not identify specific deficient acts or show prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2015) (post-conviction court findings of fact are binding; ineffective-assistance questions are mixed law and fact)
Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (petitioner's burden to show what additional testing/investigation would have produced)
Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (petitioner must allege facts showing prejudice from counsel's omissions)
Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2020) (issues not raised in the post-conviction petition are generally waived on appeal)
Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208 (Tenn. 2009) (prejudice requires a reasonable probability the result would differ absent counsel's errors)