James C. Iler and Linda Iler v. RVOS Farm Mutual Insurance Company
09-16-00011-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 16, 2017Background
- James and Linda Iler owned a home insured by RVOS; after Hurricane Ike (2008) they claimed interior water damage around rear French doors and submitted a claim.
- RVOS denied the claim, citing the policy’s Part 8 exclusion for windstorm/hurricane damage to interiors unless "direct force of wind or hail makes an opening in a roof or wall and rain enters through this opening."
- The Ilers argued that wind-created separations between a door and its frame/threshold, between two doors, or between a window and its frame constitute an "opening in a wall" and asked the court to construe the exclusion accordingly.
- The trial court ruled the policy language was unambiguous as a matter of contract, but found the factual question whether wind made an opening (e.g., by separating door/weatherstripping) was for the jury to decide; extra-contractual claims were severed and not tried.
- The jury was instructed to use ordinary meanings for words and was asked whether RVOS failed to comply with the policy given the policy’s exclusion language; the jury found in favor of RVOS and the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment.
- The Ilers’ JNOV/new-trial motions were denied; on appeal they argued (1) the court erred by submitting the exclusion’s interpretation to the jury instead of deciding it as a matter of law, (2) they conclusively proved damages and fees, and (3) the trial court abused discretion by refusing a proposed jury instruction clarifying that door/window separations are covered openings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether interpretation of the policy exclusion was a question of law for the court or a fact question for the jury | Iler: the exclusion’s scope is a matter of contract interpretation for the court; wording is unambiguous and should be decided as a matter of law | RVOS: court ruled terms unambiguous but factual dispute (whether wind created an "opening in a wall") is for the jury to resolve | Court: No error. Court may determine ambiguity; here terms given ordinary meaning and the fact question of whether wind created an opening was properly submitted to jury |
| Whether the Ilers were entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because they conclusively established coverage, damages, and fees | Iler: coverage established as matter of law, therefore JNOV and damages/fees automatic | RVOS: without jury finding insurer liable, Ilers not entitled to damages or fees | Held: Denied. Jury verdict for RVOS supported by evidence; JNOV not warranted |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by refusing the Ilers’ proposed jury instruction defining door/window separations as covered openings | Iler: instruction would clarify law and assist jury; supported by pleadings/evidence | RVOS: proposed instruction would improperly comment on weight of evidence and tell jury how to decide | Held: Refusal proper. Instruction would have told jurors how to construe contract terms and improperly nudged jury; trial court correctly instructed jurors to use ordinary meanings |
| Whether charge submission constituted improper jury construction of the contract | Iler: submitting the exclusion wording to jury amounted to asking jury to construe contract | RVOS: question presented factual application of policy language to evidence, not legal construction of parties’ obligations | Held: Submission proper because question presented factual issue (whether wind made an opening) and court instructed jurors to use ordinary meaning; no reversible charge error |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. 2010) (policy terms given ordinary meaning; ambiguous terms construed for coverage)
- State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1995) (ambiguous policy terms construed in favor of insured)
- Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2003) (parties’ differing interpretations alone do not create ambiguity)
- Knutson v. Ripson, 354 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1962) (court, not jury, should construe legal effect of an instrument)
- Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1991) (submission of factual questions based on contract terms is not error when jury simply applies facts)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2003) (jury instructions that "nudge" or comment on weight of evidence are improper)