James Brunson v. Scott Murray
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22106
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- James Brunson purchased the only package liquor store in Bridgeport and held a Class B liquor license; Mayor Max Schauf was the local liquor commissioner and had competing business interests.
- Local police chief Scott Murray repeatedly accused Brunson of non-existent liquor violations and inspected the store; Schauf delayed Brunson’s routine license renewal, forcing Brunson to close until the state Liquor Control Commission intervened.
- After vandalism at the store, Brunson confronted Jody Harshman (an associate of the Schaufs) in a late-night altercation; Harshman fled after Brunson’s gun fired; Brunson was later arrested for felony aggravated battery.
- Brunson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, denial of equal protection (class-of-one), and denial of due process (license non-renewal), plus state claims; the district court granted summary judgment to defendants and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit (Hamilton, J.) affirmed prosecutorial immunity for State’s Attorney Lisa Wade and upheld summary judgment on false arrest, but reversed denial of the equal protection claim and reversed absolute immunity for Mayor Schauf on the due process renewal claim; the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutorial immunity for Wade | Wade participated in charging/prosecution but acted improperly; she should be liable | Prosecutor’s charging and courtroom actions are absolutely immune | Held: Wade entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for charging and preliminary-hearing functions; summary judgment affirmed |
| Equal protection (class-of-one) | Schauf and others singled out Brunson in an orchestrated campaign (delays, harassment, interference) motivated by personal animus; lack of rational basis | No similarly situated comparators; therefore no class-of-one claim | Held: Reversed summary judgment — evidence of targeted, irrational harassment (and absence of comparators due to town size) suffices to survive summary judgment; claim proceeds to trial |
| False arrest (arrest on warrant) | Brunson says arrest lacked probable cause because self-defense was clear | Arrest based on facially valid warrant issued after prosecutor and court review; officers entitled to rely on it | Held: Summary judgment for defendants affirmed; arrest pursuant to valid warrant bars Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim (no Franks/knowing falsity shown) |
| Due process — non-renewal immunity (Schauf) | Schauf’s indefinite delay deprived Brunson of property without process; not entitled to absolute immunity for renewal decisions | Reed/Killinger precedent purportedly extended quasi-judicial immunity to renewal decisions | Held: Reversed — absolute immunity does not extend to routine license-renewal decisions under Cleavinger factors and recent Illinois authority; Schauf not absolutely immune on renewal claim (City liability largely rejected on appeal) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (prosecutorial decision to prosecute entitled to absolute immunity)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (distinguishing prosecutorial advocacy from investigative acts for immunity)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection theory described)
- Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (pattern of harassment can substitute for comparators in class-of-one claims)
- Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (discussing standards for class-of-one claims)
- Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (functional test and factors for absolute judicial/quasi-judicial immunity)
- Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (framework for absolute immunity analysis)
- Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (post-deprivation remedies doctrine in due process claims)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983)
