James Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hosp.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19926
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- James Brown was involuntarily discharged from Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital on Feb. 11, 2013 and transported to Sacramento without money, ID, or ties to that city.
- Brown alleged the hospital and several state health officials/doctors engaged in a practice of shipping patients out-of-state (“Greyhound therapy”), exposing him to danger while psychotic and suicidal.
- The district court initially dismissed Brown’s federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granted leave to amend; Brown sought reconsideration instead of filing an amended complaint.
- After multiple extensions and warnings, the district court dismissed Brown’s federal claims with prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply; state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice.
- On appeal, Brown challenged the 12(b)(6) dismissal and denial of reconsideration but did not raise the Rule 41(b) sanction issue in his opening brief; the Ninth Circuit held he waived that argument and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate court may consider a Rule 41(b) sanction issue not raised in opening brief | Brown argued district court erred in dismissing on Rule 41(b) (abuse of discretion) | State argued issue may be addressed; but Brown failed to preserve it in opening brief | Court declined to consider; Brown waived the Rule 41(b) argument due to omission in opening brief |
| Whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) was an abuse of discretion | Brown (dissent) argued district court abused discretion because leave to amend was permissive, not mandatory, so no ultimatum existed | State argued dismissal was proper sanction for failure to amend/comply | Majority did not reach merits (issue waived); dissent would find abuse because no clear order requiring amendment |
| Whether the prior Rule 12(b)(6) interlocutory dismissal was reviewable on appeal | Brown sought review of 12(b)(6) orders | State argued 12(b)(6) orders were unreviewable because final appealable judgment was the Rule 41(b) dismissal | Majority: cannot review prior 12(b)(6) orders absent challenge to final Rule 41(b) dismissal; affirmed |
| Whether complaint plausibly alleged a substantive due process (state-created-danger) claim | Brown argued defendants affirmatively placed him in greater danger by shipping him while psychotic to an unfamiliar city without resources | State argued Brown’s dangers preexisted hospitalization and complaint failed to show defendants created or enhanced danger | Majority did not decide on merits (waiver); dissent would reverse, finding plausible state-created-danger claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (standards for dismissal after leave to amend and for dismissal as sanction)
- United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (discusses appellate discretion to address unraised issues where manifest injustice or adequate briefing exists)
- Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order to file amended complaint)
- In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006) (delineates harshness of dismissal as sanction and standards for extreme circumstances)
- Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (state-created-danger substantive due process doctrine)
- Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (U.S. 2011) (appellate courts decide issues presented and argued by parties)