James Alan Jenkins v. State
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5667
Tex. App.2015Background
- In May 2010, James Alan Jenkins and nine others changed their voter registrations to an address at a Residence Inn located inside the Woodlands Road Utility District (RUD) and voted in the RUD board election; challengers supported by that voting bloc prevailed in the election.
- Montgomery County officials sent a warning letter (the Grant letter) identifying advisory authorities (Secretary of State and Attorney General opinions) and cautioning about criminal penalties; Jenkins consulted those opinions and an attorney before voting and later stayed at the hotel the night before the election.
- Jenkins was indicted for illegal voting under Tex. Elec. Code § 64.012(a)(1) (voting in an election when the person knows they are not eligible to vote) and tried in 2018; the jury found him guilty and he received imprisonment and a fine.
- At trial Jenkins sought a jury instruction on the statutory "mistake of law" defense (Tex. Penal Code § 8.03(b)) based on his asserted reasonable reliance on the Secretary of State and Attorney General advisory opinions and case law; the trial court denied the requested instruction.
- On appeal the court of appeals held the refused instruction was required because Jenkins introduced some evidence that he reasonably relied on official written interpretations of election law and the reasonableness of that reliance was a jury question; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jenkins) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jenkins was entitled to a jury instruction on the statutory mistake-of-law defense (Tex. Penal Code § 8.03) | The defense is an affirmative, confession-and-avoidance type theory or otherwise duplicates/negates an element of the offense and was not required; Jenkins did not admit the conduct as criminal. | Jenkins reasonably relied on official written election-law authorities (Secretary of State, Attorney General opinions and Mills) so § 8.03 applied and the jury should decide reasonableness. | Court: § 8.03 may negate culpable mental state where the charged element incorporates a legal-knowledge component; Jenkins produced some evidence of reasonable reliance; refusal to instruct was error. |
| Whether the mistake-of-law defense is subject to the confession-and-avoidance doctrine | The State: yes — mistake-of-law is an affirmative defense that excuses conduct and thus requires confession-and-avoidance prerequisites. | Jenkins: § 8.03’s text and definition of "conduct" (act plus mental state) show the defense can negate a culpable mental state tied to legal knowledge; confession-and-avoidance does not apply here. | Court: § 8.03 can negate the culpable mental state and is not categorically subject to confession-and-avoidance; Jenkins was not required to admit all elements to invoke it. |
| Whether Jenkins’s reliance on advisory opinions was reasonable as a matter of law | The State: reliance was unreasonable given the statutory definition of "residence," the totality of facts (organized plan to vote at a hotel), and that opinions addressed students. | Jenkins: opinions expressly discuss the statute and Mills; authorities were proper written interpretations and supported a reasonable belief of residency for voting. | Court: factual dispute about reasonableness was raised by the evidence and must go to the jury; refusal to submit the defense was error. |
| Whether omission of the § 8.03 instruction was harmless | The State: no harm because the jury was instructed on the elements (including knowledge) and heard the same authority and arguments; counsel argued mistake of law. | Jenkins: omission deprived jury of the statutory vehicle to find a reasonable mistake of law and was therefore harmful. | Court: error caused "some harm" because the charge deprived the jury of the statutory defensive theory as law of the case; reversal and remand for new trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1964) (residence for voting depends on bodily presence and present intention; no fixed durational requirement)
- Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (two-step jury-charge review framework)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (preserved jury-charge error requires reversal if it caused "some harm")
- Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (trial court must instruct jury on statutory defenses raised by the evidence)
- Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (confession-and-avoidance doctrine inapplicable when defensive issue negates culpable mental state)
- Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the evidence)
- Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (limits on mistake-of-law reliance; defendant may not rely on overruled/conflicting authorities)
- Cornet v. State, 417 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (analysis of harmfulness where confession-and-avoidance instruction omitted)