James Adams v. Governor of Delaware, 922 F.3d 166

Background

James R. Adams, an attorney and recent Independent, challenged Article IV, §3 of the Delaware Constitution after refraining from applying for judicial vacancies limited to members of the two major parties (Democrat/Republican).
Article IV, §3 contains two interconnected components: a "bare majority" limit and a "major political party" requirement that in practice restricts most judicial appointments to Democrats and Republicans.
Delaware selects judges via a politically balanced nominating commission that posts party membership requirements for specific openings; governors nominate from commission lists subject to Senate confirmation.
Adams sued the Governor in federal court claiming the provision violates his First Amendment freedom of association; the District Court granted summary judgment for Adams, finding the provision unconstitutional in its entirety.
On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: it found Adams had Article III and prudential standing to challenge the sections that combine the bare-majority and major-party components (Supreme, Superior, Chancery Courts) but not the sections containing only the bare-majority component (Family Court, Court of Common Pleas).
The Third Circuit held judges are not within the Elrod/Branti policymaking exception and that Delaware failed to show the major-party restriction is narrowly tailored to a vital state interest; the major-party components for the three high courts were therefore struck as unconstitutional and not severable from their paired bare-majority clauses.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Adams)	Defendant's Argument (Carney)	Held
Whether Adams has Article III standing to challenge §3 provisions	Adams refrained from applying because provision bars Independents from certain vacancies, causing concrete injury	Governor contested standing for some sections (Family Court / Common Pleas)	Adams has standing to challenge sections with the major-party component (Supreme, Superior, Chancery) but not sections containing only the bare-majority component; prudential standing does not substitute for Article III standing
Whether judges fall within the Elrod/Branti policymaking exception permitting partisan hiring	Party affiliation condition on judgeship is unconstitutional because judges must be impartial; party allegiance is not necessary for judicial duties	Governor: judges are policymakers who make law and policy, so partisan affiliation may be required	Court: Judges are not policymakers for Elrod/Branti purposes; party allegiance is not an appropriate job requirement
Whether Delaware's interest in political balance justifies excluding Independents/third parties	Political-balance goal does not justify excluding non-major-party applicants; infringement must be narrowly tailored	Governor: political-balance is a legitimate state interest that can justify party-based rules	Even assuming a vital interest, §3 is not narrowly tailored: Delaware failed to show the major-party restriction is the least restrictive means
Severability: can the bare-majority component remain if the major-party component is struck	Adams argued major-party component is inseparable and unconstitutional; remedy requires striking paired provisions	Governor argued bare-majority could stand alone	The major-party component is not severable from the paired provisions for the Supreme, Superior, and Chancery Courts; those sections are invalidated; Family Court and Common Pleas sections were not reached due to lack of standing

Key Cases Cited

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (plurality) (political patronage dismissals implicate First Amendment; narrow policymaking exception noted)
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (policy: party affiliation permissible only when it is an appropriate requirement for effective performance)
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (extension of anti-patronage principles to hiring, promotion, and transfer decisions)