120 A.3d 588
D.C.2015Background
- On Dec. 16, 2007 James Corbin was tried for two separate carjacking incidents: (1) Eva Kleederman (appellant entered passenger seat, tried to pull ignition key, grabbed other keys, attempted to remove Kleederman; fled when interveners arrived) and (2) Christine Cannon (man entered driver’s seat, threatened, drove off with passenger, later ejected her). DNA from blood in Kleederman’s car later matched Corbin.
- Jury convicted Corbin of two unarmed carjackings and related robbery/theft counts; he received consecutive 90-month sentences for each carjacking.
- Corbin argued the evidence only proved an attempted (not completed) carjacking of Kleederman and that the carjacking statute (D.C. Code § 22-2803(a)(1)) does not clearly criminalize attempted unarmed carjacking.
- He also appealed two trial rulings: (1) permitting the government to inform the jury of the defendant’s right to independent DNA testing under Teoume-Lessane, and (2) refusing a jury instruction describing scientific research on eyewitness reliability.
- The Court found the evidence insufficient to show Corbin completed Kleederman’s carjacking and addressed whether § 22-2803(a)(1) criminalizes attempted unarmed carjacking; it also reviewed the DNA and eyewitness-instruction rulings for abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Corbin) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence showed completed carjacking of Kleederman | Act was only an attempt; Kleederman never relinquished immediate actual possession | Circumstantial evidence (presence in car, force, attempts to remove keys/driver) supported taking | Held: Evidence insufficient to prove completed carjacking; supports attempted carjacking only |
| Whether D.C. carjacking statute §22-2803(a)(1) proscribes attempted unarmed carjacking | Statute’s wording places "or attempts to do so" before "shall take," so it modifies means, not the taking; thus unarmed attempts are outside §22-2803 and fall under general attempt statute §22-1803 | The phrase can reasonably be read to modify the taking (i.e., proscribing attempts to take); prior cases have treated carjacking to include attempts | Held: Ambiguity exists; under rule of lenity, §22-2803(a)(1) does not reach attempted unarmed carjacking. Attempt punished under §22-1803. Vacated conviction and remanded for resentencing as attempt. |
| Whether government may rebut DNA reliability attack by informing jury of defendant’s right to independent testing (Teoume-Lessane) | Defense did not argue government bias; counsel attacked methods/competence, so Teoume-Lessane rebuttal was not opened | Government argued defense attacked FBI procedures sufficiently to open door for independent-testing rebuttal | Held: Trial court erred in extending Teoume-Lessane to competence/reliability challenges (door opens only for suggested bias), but error was harmless given DNA evidence and curative instruction. |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying jury instruction summarizing eyewitness-reliability scientific research | Wanted Henderson-style instruction describing research on memory and confidence to evaluate Cannon’s ID | Govt: no expert testimony or studies in record; standard Red Book instruction adequate | Held: No abuse of discretion. Court permissibly declined to instruct on research not presented as evidence and instead used model (Red Book) instruction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. United States, 697 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1997) (defines elements of carjacking and immediate actual possession)
- Winstead v. United States, 809 A.2d 607 (D.C. 2002) (victim retains immediate actual possession while able to retain physical control unless deterred by force or fear)
- Moorer v. United States, 868 A.2d 137 (D.C. 2005) (carjacking requires possession or control; asportation not required)
- Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478 (D.C. 2007) (defense suggestion of government bias in DNA testing opens door to rebuttal about defendant’s right to independent testing)
- Whitfield v. United States, 99 A.3d 650 (D.C. 2014) (statutory ambiguity resolved under rule of lenity; can invoke only when language, structure, purpose, history leave genuine doubt)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (harmless error standard applied to constitutional and non-constitutional trial errors)