Jameka K. Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4301
11th Cir.2017Background
- Evans, a pro se former security officer at Georgia Regional Hospital (employed 2012–2018), alleged sex-based discrimination, gender nonconformity discrimination, sexual-orientation discrimination, harassment, and retaliation after she complained to HR and raised concerns about misconduct by her supervisor Moss.
- She sued the Hospital and individual supervisors, sought in forma pauperis status and counsel; the magistrate screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
- The magistrate concluded sexual-orientation claims are not cognizable under Title VII, treated gender-nonconformity as merely a re-labeling of sexual-orientation discrimination, rejected the retaliation claim, and recommended dismissal with prejudice and no leave to amend.
- The district court adopted the R&R without further comment and dismissed with prejudice; Lambda Legal and the EEOC filed amicus briefs supporting Evans on appeal (Lambda Legal appointed counsel for appeal).
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo, held gender-nonconformity claims are actionable under Title VII but Evans’s complaint failed to plausibly plead such a claim and remanded with leave to amend; it affirmed dismissal of the sexual-orientation claim as foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent and deemed the retaliation argument waived.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether discrimination for gender nonconformity is actionable under Title VII | Evans: yes — gender nonconformity is sex-based discrimination and actionable | Magistrate: it is just sexual-orientation discrimination and not covered | Court: gender nonconformity is actionable; dismissal vacated as to that claim and plaintiff given leave to amend because complaint lacked sufficient factual detail |
| Whether sexual-orientation discrimination is actionable under Title VII | Evans & EEOC: sexual-orientation discrimination constitutes sex discrimination | Magistrate & district court: sexual orientation is not protected under Title VII | Court: affirmed dismissal — bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent (Blum) that sexual-orientation claims are not cognizable under Title VII |
| Whether Evans pleaded retaliation for complaining to HR | Evans: she had a reasonable good-faith belief employer acted unlawfully; retaliation claim viable | Magistrate: no protected opposition to unlawful practice (because sexual orientation not protected) | Court: Evans failed to object below to R&R on retaliation; argument waived on appeal; no review (not reached on merits) |
| Whether dismissal should have been with prejudice/no leave to amend | Evans: as pro se, should be allowed to amend; new evidence supports amendment | Magistrate: amendment futile; district court adopted R&R | Court: dismissal with prejudice improper as to gender-nonconformity (and possibly others); remanded with instruction to permit one amendment unless futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII prohibits discrimination based on failure to conform to sex stereotypes)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (Title VII's text governs sex-discrimination scope regardless of legislative expectations)
- Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (discrimination against transgender person for gender nonconformity is sex discrimination)
- Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (Eleventh Circuit precedent: sexual-orientation discharge not prohibited by Title VII)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard for complaints)
- Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2015) (Title VII complaint need not allege full prima facie case but must plausibly suggest intentional discrimination)
- Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003) (standards for de novo review of §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals)