Jamar Minor v. State of Indiana, 36 N.E.3d 1065

On June 11, 2013, Jamar Minor and Jordan Gray fired multiple shots from a parked SUV into a group of young men; Damien died from two gunshot wounds and Eric Taylor was severely wounded.
Police recovered shell casings from two different 9mm weapons and an unfired .40 under a nearby van; both Minor and Gray were charged with murder, Class A felony attempted murder (Taylor), and carrying a handgun without a license; Minor later admitted firearm use at sentencing.
At trial Minor claimed self-defense, testified that Damien pointed a gun at him, and sought to admit an unsworn police statement by Dazion Dulin that Damien had said he had a gun. The trial court excluded that evidence as hearsay.
The jury convicted Minor of murder and attempted murder; Minor appealed, raising three principal errors: (1) exclusion of the Dulin statement (hearsay), (2) an accomplice-liability jury instruction that omitted that accomplices must share the specific intent to kill for attempted murder, and (3) the trial court’s refusal to instruct on criminal recklessness as an inherently lesser-included offense of attempted murder.
The Court of Appeals reviewed discretionary evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, considered instructional error and prejudice/harmlessness, and applied controlling Indiana precedent on lesser-included offenses.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Minor)	Held
Admissibility of Dulin’s out-of-court statement (double hearsay)	Statement was inadmissible hearsay; each layer must fit an exception	Dulin relayed Damien’s statement that he had a gun; admissible as present-sense impression or statement against interest	Court: Exclusion not an abuse of discretion — statement did not meet present-sense or statement-against-interest exceptions, so hearsay properly excluded
Accomplice-liability jury instruction for attempted murder	Jury was instructed on attempted murder and accomplice liability; no reversible error because conviction sustained by evidence of direct liability	Instruction omitted that an accomplice must have specific intent to kill for attempted murder; that omission could allow conviction without specific intent	Court: Instruction was erroneous but harmless — overwhelming evidence supported direct liability and State/defense argued specific intent, so no prejudice shown
Criminal recklessness instruction as an inherently lesser-included offense of attempted murder	Recklessness not an inherently included offense under Indiana law	Minor argued recklessness should be an inherently included lesser offense of attempted murder	Court: Refusal proper — bound by precedent that criminal recklessness is not an inherently lesser-included offense of attempted murder

Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559 (Ind. 2014) (trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence)
Teague v. State, 978 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (hearsay inadmissible unless an exception applies; multiple hearsay requires each layer to satisfy an exception)
Palacios v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (Rule 805 requires each layer of hearsay to meet an exception)
Amos v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (elements of present sense impression exception)
Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. 2001) (when attempted murder is premised on accomplice liability, jury must be instructed that accomplice must have specific intent to kill)
Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8 (Ind. 2015) (erroneous accomplice instruction can be fundamentally prejudicial when verdict basis—accomplice vs direct liability—is unclear and prosecutor minimizes intent requirement)
Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. 2000) (criminal recklessness is not an inherently lesser-included offense of attempted murder)
Fry v. State, 748 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. 2001) (preservation of instructional error requires timely, specific objection)