Jalesia McQueen, Appellant. v. Justin Gadberry
507 S.W.3d 127
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- McQueen and Gadberry (married 2005, separated 2010) created four pre-embryos via IVF during the marriage; two were implanted and resulted in twin sons; two remained cryopreserved.
- Dispute in their 2013 dissolution centered solely on disposition of the two frozen pre-embryos stored at Fairfax Cryobank.
- Fairfax forms (a multi-page "Directive") were completed by McQueen and Gadberry in May 2010; the trial court found irregularities and credibility issues (different dates, handwriting, and that McQueen largely controlled completion).
- Trial court classified the frozen pre-embryos as "marital property of a special character," awarded them to the parties jointly, and ordered no use, transfer, or release without both signatures; it rejected treating embryos as "children" under Chapter 452 and found the Fairfax Directive unenforceable.
- On appeal, McQueen challenged (1) classification as property rather than children, (2) failure to require the guardian ad litem (GAL) to advocate for the embryos’ best interests, and (3) the joint award instead of awarding the embryos to her or dividing them.
Issues
| Issue | McQueen's Argument | Gadberry's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether frozen pre-embryos should be treated as "children" under Chapter 452 (applying §1.205 life-begins-at-conception language) | §1.205 and §188.015 definitions make fertilized eggs "unborn children" entitled to rights under dissolution law; embryos therefore should be treated like children | Application of §1.205 to in vitro embryos would infringe his constitutional privacy/procreational-rights; courts must protect procreational autonomy | Court: declined to apply §1.205 to in vitro frozen pre-embryos here; balanced parties’ procreational autonomy and held classifying as children would violate Gadberry’s constitutional rights; affirmed property classification |
| Whether appointment/role of GAL required advocacy for the embryos’ "best interests" | Trial court should have required GAL to advocate for embryos as children under §452.423 (custody proceedings) | Appointment of GAL was improper because frozen embryos are not "children" under Chapter 452; custody statutes inapplicable | Court: no error—embryos are not children under Chapter 452 here; appointment/limited participation of GAL was not prejudicial |
| Whether Fairfax Directive (cryobank forms) was a valid, enforceable written agreement excluding the embryos from marital property | The Directive unambiguously gave embryos to McQueen on divorce and is a valid written contract making them her separate property | Directive is invalid/unenforceable due to irregular execution, lack of meaningful disclosure, and lack of mutual intent | Court: Directive not proven by clear-and-convincing evidence to be a valid written agreement; trial court’s credibility findings supported rejecting it |
| Whether court erred in awarding embryos jointly instead of dividing/awarding to one party | If embryos are marital property, they should have been divided or awarded to McQueen per Directive | Joint award with requirement of both parties’ signed authorization preserves both parties’ constitutional interests and is an appropriate equitable remedy | Court: affirmed joint award with restriction (no use/transfer without both signatures) as an appropriate disposition when property is "special" and not susceptible to a just division |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1973) (right of personal privacy extends to decisions about procreation and abortion)
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (U.S. 2015) (choices about family, procreation, and childrearing are constitutionally protected)
- Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (balancing of competing procreational interests in disposition of frozen embryos; procreational autonomy of both gamete providers)
- J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (approach weighing relative interests of parties over disposition of stored embryos)
- Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976) (standard of appellate review for bench trials)
- Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. banc 1995) (Missouri courts should read statutes in pari materia with §1.205, subject to U.S. Constitution)
- Knapp, State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. banc 1992) (interpreting §1.205 to apply to in utero fetus for certain state statutes)
- Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (U.S. 1989) (addressed §1.205 language and left application to state courts)