Jalen Lee, A Minor Child, by and through his Next Friend, Crystal Estes and Crystal Estes, Individually v. Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation, City of Columbus
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 157
Ind. Ct. App.2017Background
- On March 11, 2013, 13‑year‑old Jalen Lee was struck while using a marked mid‑block crosswalk on Marr Road near Columbus East High School; he suffered serious injuries.
- Lee routinely used the crosswalk, looked both ways before crossing, saw the approaching truck, and believed he had time to cross; the driver (McLeod) did not see Lee until impact.
- The crosswalk had high‑visibility pavement markings and warning signs; there were two speed‑limit signs on the northbound approach (a 20 mph school zone sign 1,264 ft away and a 30 mph sign 427 ft away) creating potential ambiguity.
- The City had been planning to install rectangular rapid flashing beacons (RRFBs) at six crossings (including Marr Road) using federal HSIP funds; planning and contracting steps were underway but construction had not begun by the accident date.
- Lee sued the City for negligence (failure to warn/prescribe safer conditions); the trial court granted summary judgment for the City based on contributory negligence. The appellate court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper based on contributory negligence | Lee argued he looked both ways and reasonably believed he could safely cross; disputed facts create multiple inferences | City argued Lee knew and was taught to wait for vehicles to stop and nevertheless entered the crosswalk | Trial court erred — contributory negligence was a jury question because evidence supports reasonable‑action inference |
| Whether City entitled to discretionary‑function immunity for failing to install additional warnings (e.g., RRFBs) | Lee contended City made ad hoc decisions and had not shown conscious policy balancing | City showed multi‑phase planning, funding applications, contracts, and coordination with INDOT for RRFB project | City entitled to discretionary‑function immunity for planning/decision to install RRFBs (planning stage shielded) |
| Whether City immune for failure to adopt or enforce traffic controls (lower speed limit, stop sign, crossing guards) | Lee argued such operational choices could be actionable | City argued those are legislative/enforcement decisions shielded by ITCA § 34‑13‑3‑3(8) | City immune for failure to enact reduced speed zone, install stop sign, or assign crossing guards |
| Whether conflicting speed‑limit signs could constitute actionable negligence and proximate cause | Lee argued improper sign placement created ambiguity that likely affected timing and caused the collision | City argued Marr Road was reasonably safe and signage complied with standards per its expert; driver’s failure to see Lee breaks causal link | Court held issue of whether placement of speed‑limit signs breached duty and proximately caused injury is a genuine fact question for jury, so summary judgment improper on that ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Wabash Cnty. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n v. Thompson, 975 N.E.2d 362 (discusses summary judgment standard)
- Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15 (negligence cases are fact‑sensitive; summary judgment rare)
- Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 522 (moving party must negate an essential negligence element or show affirmative defense)
- Hill v. Gephart, 54 N.E.3d 402 (comparative fault vs. contributory negligence for suits against governmental entities)
- Clay City Consol. Sch. Corp. v. Timberman, 918 N.E.2d 292 (standard of care and rebuttable presumption for children ages 7–14)
- Maldonado by Maldonado v. Gill, 502 N.E.2d 1371 (child who looked and stopped before crossing creates fact issue on contributory negligence)
- Smith v. Diamond, 421 N.E.2d 1172 (twelve‑year‑old held contributorily negligent where he failed to check for traffic)
- Lee v. State, 682 N.E.2d 576 (planning stage improvements can trigger discretionary‑function immunity)
- City of Beech Grove v. Beloat, 50 N.E.3d 135 (insufficient evidence of conscious policy balancing defeats discretionary‑function immunity)
- Joseph v. LaPorte Cnty., 651 N.E.2d 1180 (planning/operational test for discretionary immunity)
- Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 756 N.E.2d 970 (ITCA construed narrowly against immunity)
- Correll v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 783 N.E.2d 706 (causation/proximate cause is generally a jury question)