Jaeger v. Jaeger
307 Neb. 910
| Neb. | 2020Background
- Stacey and Duke Jaeger divorced; 2011 decree awarded joint legal custody but Stacey sole physical custody of son C.J., with Duke parenting time; prior abuse allegations by Stacey against Duke (pre-2011) were investigated and found unfounded.
- In 2018 Duke filed to modify custody. The case was transferred to Lancaster County and heard by the district court.
- The court heard in camera testimony from C.J., then 14, who expressed a mature preference to live with Duke because of shared farming and outdoor interests and a desire to learn farming.
- The district court found Stacey frequently untruthful, engaged in parental alienation (pointing to estrangement of older son H.J.), had poorer finances and less stable housing, and that Stacey’s behavior had worsened since 2011.
- The court concluded there was a material change in circumstances and that transferring sole legal and physical custody to Duke was in C.J.’s best interests; Stacey retained alternate‑weekend parenting time and was ordered to pay child support. Stacey moved for a new trial and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2018 modification (transfer of sole legal and physical custody to Duke) was an abuse of discretion | Stacey: District court gave undue weight to C.J.’s stated preference; child’s preference alone cannot establish a material change | Duke: C.J.’s matured preference plus evolving parent‑child relationship, shared interests, and Stacey’s conduct show a material change and favor best interests | Affirmed. Court found multiple factors (age/maturity, shared farming interests, evolving relationship, evidence of parental alienation and poorer parental stability) supported material change and best interests determination; Duke met his burden to modify custody. |
| Whether exclusion of Stacey’s testimony about pre‑2011 abuse allegations was reversible error | Stacey: Exclusion deprived her of relevant evidence showing past abuse by Duke | Duke: Such testimony concerned pre‑2011 events irrelevant to post‑2011 material change; allegations were already in the record and had been found unfounded | Not reversible. Court held exclusion was not prejudicial because the subject matter was cumulative and prior investigations and records were already before the court. |
| Whether the district court abused discretion in denying Stacey’s motion for new trial/reconsideration | Stacey: Trial irregularities and insufficiency of evidence warranted a new trial | Duke: Decision was supported by ample evidence; no deprivation of fair trial shown | Denied. Court found the decision was supported by sufficient evidence and no showing of unfair trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tilson v. Tilson, 948 N.W.2d 768 (2020) (standards for custody modification and deference to trial court)
- State on behalf of Slingsby v. Slingsby, 903 N.W.2d 491 (2017) (child’s preference considered with evidence of an evolving parent–child relationship)
- Leners v. Leners, 925 N.W.2d 704 (2019) (child preference entitled to consideration when child is of sufficient age and reasoning)
- Jones v. Jones, 941 N.W.2d 501 (2020) (best‑interests framework and modification burden)
- Metcalf v. Metcalf, 769 N.W.2d 386 (2009) (relevance of pre‑existing circumstances to material change analysis)
- Vogel v. Vogel, 637 N.W.2d 611 (2002) (weight to give child’s stated preference, particularly for children over 10)