Jae Lee v. United States
137 S. Ct. 1958
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Jae Lee, a lawful permanent resident who'd lived in the U.S. since age 13, was indicted for possession with intent to distribute ecstasy after a search found drugs, cash, and a rifle.
- Lee repeatedly asked his plea counsel whether pleading guilty would lead to deportation; counsel assured him it would not. Relying on that advice, Lee pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day.
- After plea and sentencing, Lee learned his conviction qualified as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, producing mandatory deportation.
- Lee moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC); the Government conceded deficient performance but the courts below held Lee failed to show prejudice because he had no viable defense and likely would have been convicted at trial.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Lee satisfied Strickland prejudice when counsel's error caused him to accept a deportation-producing plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lee) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lee shows Strickland prejudice from counsel's erroneous advice about deportation | Lee: He would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised and would have insisted on trial; deportation was dispositive for him | Gov't: With overwhelming evidence and no viable defense, Lee could not show a reasonable probability of a better outcome at trial | Held: Lee showed prejudice under Hill — a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial |
| Whether a defendant with no viable defense can as a matter of law never show prejudice from foregoing trial | Lee: No categorical bar; decision to plead may hinge on consequences (e.g., deportation) not only likelihood of acquittal | Gov't: Adopt per se rule: absent a viable defense, no prejudice because likely conviction and identical immigration consequence | Held: Rejected per se rule; must be case-by-case, considering defendant's decisionmaking and consequences |
| Role of contemporaneous record versus post hoc assertions in proving what defendant would have done | Lee: Plea colloquy, counsel and defendant testimony, and strong U.S. ties substantiate his claim | Gov't: Post hoc assertions insufficient; must show rejecting plea would have been rational given likely deportation after trial | Held: Contemporaneous evidence supported Lee; it was rational to risk more prison time for some chance to avoid deportation |
| Standard for prejudice at plea stage (whether must show better end result) | Lee: Under Hill, showing he would have gone to trial suffices when error affected plea-consequences understanding | Gov't/Dissent: Strickland requires showing the ultimate result would likely have been different (i.e., better) | Held: Court: For errors affecting plea-consequence understanding, Hill's showing that defendant would have insisted on trial can satisfy prejudice; need not always show likely better outcome at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part IAC test: performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice at plea stage shown by reasonable probability defendant would have insisted on trial)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must advise re: immigration consequences; deportation is a particularly severe penalty)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (prejudice inquiry can address forfeiture of a proceeding entirely)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (counsel must communicate plea offers; prejudice requires reasonable probability of a more favorable end result)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (IAC for bad plea advice requires showing the outcome would have been more favorable)
- Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (insistence on strict application of Strickland at plea-stage reviews)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (immigration consequences are central to plea decisions)