Jade Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass'n, 972 F.3d 809

Jade Thompson, a nonmember teacher in Marietta, Ohio, sued the Marietta Education Association and Board of Education after Janus, challenging Ohio’s statute that designates a union as the exclusive bargaining representative for a public-employee bargaining unit.
Under Ohio Rev. Code § 4117, a union recognized by a majority becomes the exclusive representative; employers must bargain with it and may not bargain with individual employees or other organizations.
Thompson objects to the union’s positions (e.g., seniority in layoffs, benefit priorities) and contends the union speaks for her in bargaining, forcing association/compelled speech and impairing her ability to communicate with the government.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding Supreme Court precedent (Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight) foreclosed Thompson’s claims.
The Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, holding Knight and other Supreme Court decisions control even after Janus and rejecting Thompson’s constitutional challenges.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ohio’s exclusive-representation scheme compels speech/association in violation of the First Amendment	Thompson: Exclusive representative speaks for nonmembers in bargaining, forcing association and compelled speech	Defendants: Knight forecloses this claim; nonmembers are not required to join and remain free to associate	Held: Rejected—Knight controls; claim foreclosed; summary judgment for defendants
Whether exclusive representation unconstitutionally burdens Thompson’s right to communicate with government (tilting the field)	Thompson: Designation amplifies union voice and disadvantages her speech before government actors	Defendants: No affirmative constitutional duty to listen or bargain with Thompson; Smith and Knight permit government to choose advisers and listen to others	Held: Rejected—Smith and Knight foreclose the claim; no constitutional violation
Whether Thompson waived her communication-based claim	Thompson: She raised the theory in complaint and summary-judgment papers and continued it on appeal	Defendants: Duty to raise at preliminary injunction stage; argued waiver	Held: Court finds no intentional relinquishment; even if district court misstated waiver, it considered the merits and appellate review proceeds

Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (exclusive representative may speak for unit without violating nonmembers’ First Amendment rights)
Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (public-sector agency-fee precedent; emphasized harms of compelled speech but did not overrule Knight)
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (government has no affirmative obligation to listen, respond, or bargain with individuals)
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (First Amendment protects right not to speak)
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (freedom of association includes freedom not to associate)
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (lower courts must follow directly controlling Supreme Court precedent even if it appears inconsistent with later decisions)
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (lower courts should follow Supreme Court precedents that directly control a case and leave overruling to the Supreme Court)