Jacqueline Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia
918 F.3d 1213
| 11th Cir. | 2019Background
- Jacqueline Lewis, an African-American Union City police detective, was placed on unpaid administrative leave in June–July 2010 after her doctor advised against her exposure to Tasers and pepper spray because of a chronic heart condition; she failed to submit FMLA paperwork and was terminated for unapproved absence.
- Lewis sued under Title VII, § 1981, and the Equal Protection Clause alleging race and sex discrimination; the City moved for summary judgment.
- Lewis identified two white male officers (McClure and Heard) as comparators who were placed on administrative leave years later under the department’s physical-fitness policy (90-day leave provision); one returned to work, the other was on leave far longer before termination.
- A panel reversed the district court; the Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc to resolve the proper comparator standard and whether the comparators were sufficiently similar.
- The en banc court held that comparator analysis belongs in the prima facie stage and adopted the standard that a plaintiff must show comparators were “similarly situated in all material respects.”
- Applying that standard, the court concluded Lewis’s proffered comparators were not similar in all material respects (different policies, different underlying conditions, timing), and affirmed summary judgment for the City; partial concurrence/dissent argued the majority made the prima facie burden too demanding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Where should comparator analysis occur in McDonnell Douglas? | Move qualitative comparator analysis to pretext stage so prima facie burden stays minimal (flexible inquiry later). | Keep comparator assessment in prima facie stage as an element of showing discrimination. | Comparator analysis must remain part of the prima facie case. |
| What test defines “similarly situated”? | Adopt Seventh Circuit’s relaxed “not so different as to be useless” common-sense standard. | Retain Eleventh Circuit’s older “nearly identical” formulation. | Adopt a middle-ground: comparators must be “similarly situated in all material respects.” |
| What factors govern the “all material respects” inquiry? | (Lewis) Emphasize practical similarity; many differences are for pretext stage. | (City) Emphasize strict similarity in relevant policies, conduct, and supervisory context. | Court lists guideposts: same basic conduct/misconduct, same policy/rule, usually same supervisor, similar employment/disciplinary history; focus on substantive rather than formal similarity. |
| Application to Lewis’s comparators | McClure and Heard were valid comparators because all were placed on administrative leave for being unfit for duty. | Comparators differ materially: different policies (post‑hoc fitness policy vs personnel policy), different conditions (remediable fitness failures vs chronic cardiac restriction), and timing. | Lewis failed to show similarity in all material respects; summary judgment for the City affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
- Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (explains prima facie case purpose and burden shifting)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (discusses prima facie case and limits of presumptions)
- Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (prima facie comparator inquiry in failure‑to‑accommodate/PDA context; comparators need not be identical)
- Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (clarifies prima facie proof and employer discretion)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (use of prima facie evidence in showing pretext and the ultimate issue of discrimination)
- Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing comparator element of prima facie case)