Jacquelin S. Bennett v. T. Heyward Carter, Jr., 421 S.C. 374

Mother was lifetime beneficiary of two trusts; Respondents are residual beneficiaries (her daughters) and later sued individually.
The Stevenson brothers (sons) were co-trustees and are alleged to have withdrawn about $5 million from the trusts from ~1999–2006.
Kerrison and Dixon Hughes (Petitioners) prepared tax returns and later performed bookkeeping; they possessed trust checkbooks and wrote checks at the brothers' requests after a 2001 meeting where Kerrison warned the brothers about improper transactions.
Petitioners informed Mother’s attorney Carter of the suspect transactions in 2001; Respondents were not told until 2006. Petitioners contend disclosure to Respondents was restricted by federal tax confidentiality rules.
Respondents sued Petitioners (2009) for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty; trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioners on statute-of-limitations grounds and on the aiding-and-abetting claim; Court of Appeals reversed as to aiding-and-abetting.
Supreme Court reviewed whether (1) sufficient evidence exists to let the aiding-and-abetting claim survive summary judgment and (2) that claim abated on Mother’s death; it affirmed the Court of Appeals as modified.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does evidence suffice to survive summary judgment on aiding-and-abetting a fiduciary breach?	Respondents: Petitioners knowingly participated by possessing checkbooks and writing checks for improper withdrawals.	Petitioners: Mere nondisclosure cannot establish knowing participation; any disclosure was barred by tax-confidentiality laws.	Court: Evidence that Petitioners had checkbooks and wrote checks supports a jury finding of knowing participation; nondisclosure alone is not sufficient.
Does an aiding-and-abetting claim abate on the death of the primary victim (Mother)?	Respondents: Their individual beneficiary claims survived because their damages are independent of Mother’s estate.	Petitioners: Claim should abate as it rests on alleged fraud against Mother; survivability exceptions (fraud) bar it.	Court: Claim survives Mother’s death — Respondents’ individual damages do not derive from Mother’s personal injury and the fraud exception does not bar survival.

Quail Hill, LLC v. County of Richland, 387 S.C. 223, 692 S.E.2d 499 (applicable standard for summary judgment) (2010)
Future Group, II v. Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, 478 S.E.2d 45 (defines elements of aiding-and-abetting fiduciary breach) (1996)
Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 633 S.E.2d 505 (summary-judgment evidence viewed in light most favorable to nonmovant) (2006)
Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 744 S.E.2d 161 (limits on creating unreasonable inferences at summary judgment) (2013)
Crystal Ice Co. of Columbia, Inc. v. First Colonial Corp., 273 S.C. 306, 257 S.E.2d 496 (principle that principal has constructive knowledge of agent's notice) (1979)
Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 256, 15 S.E.2d 117 (fraud exception to survivability of causes of action) (1941)