55 Misc. 3d 470
N.Y. Sup. Ct.2017Background
- Plaintiff is a political strategist and TV commentator who regularly gave commentary about Donald Trump during the 2016 Republican primary.
- Plaintiff met twice in May–June 2015 with campaign representatives (including Lewandowski and a campaign employee) about a possible communications position but did not accept or receive an offer after a second meeting she found unprofessional.
- After plaintiff criticized Trump on television in January–February 2016, Lewandowski said on-air that plaintiff had sought a job from the Trump campaign and, when rejected, became hostile; Trump tweeted that plaintiff “begged us for a job” and called her derogatory names.
- Followers of Trump’s tweets posted abusive and graphic attacks on plaintiff.
- Plaintiff sued for defamation, alleging defendants falsely stated she had begged for a job and was rejected to impugn her professional integrity; defendants moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).
- The court treated the complaint’s allegations as true for the motion and considered whether the challenged statements were reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning or were protected opinion/hyperbole.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statements that plaintiff "begged" for a job and was "turned down" are actionable defamation | The statements are false factual assertions (not opinion) that impute bias and impaired professional integrity and thus injure her reputation | Statements are hyperbolic, vague, and rhetorical political attack; protected opinion and non-actionable in context | Court held statements are nonactionable opinion/hyperbole in the political/Twitter context and dismissed the complaint |
| Whether Trump’s insulting tweets (e.g., “dummy,” “loser”) state actionable facts | Insults supported the false job-seeking assertion and harmed reputation | Insults are pure opinion/rhetorical abuse not capable of objective verification | Court held insults are nonactionable opinion and rhetorical hyperbole |
| Whether context (television talk shows and Twitter during a heated political campaign) converts statements into factual assertions | Context does not change the asserted falsity into protected opinion—readers would accept the asserted job-solicitation as factual | Context (TV debate, Twitter, campaign rhetoric) signals to reasonable readers hyperbole and opinion, not provable fact | Court held context indicates opinion/hyperbole; reasonable readers would not treat statements as factual |
| Whether statements could be defamatory per se (imputing unprofessional conduct) | Statements that she sought job and was rejected imply improper professional conduct and damaged her ability to work | Being turned down for a job, absent insinuation of misconduct, is not defamation per se; no implication of fraud or incompetence here | Court declined to reach per se analysis as statements are nonactionable opinion; also found rejection alone does not imply misconduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (N.Y. 2014) (distinguishes fact from opinion by context; court must decide whether words are reasonably susceptible of defamatory meaning)
- Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283 (N.Y. 1986) (statements in heated public disputes may be opinion/hyperbole)
- Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146 (N.Y. 1993) (opinion protection when predicate facts are disclosed or when the communication is nonfactual commentary)
- Mann v. Abel, 10 N.Y.3d 271 (N.Y. 2008) (opinions are privileged; an opinion cannot be proved false)
- Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429 (N.Y. 1992) (defamation per se for statements imputing improper performance of professional duties)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (First Amendment foundations for protecting opinions in public debate)
- Aronson v. Wiersma, 65 N.Y.2d 592 (N.Y. 1985) (mere discharge or not being hired does not, by itself, imply misconduct)