Jacobson v. Shresta
288 Neb. 615
| Neb. | 2014Background
- Virginia Jacobson was admitted to Gordon Memorial Hospital after aspirating a piece of meat; Drs. Shresta and Cornu-Labat treated her and she died days later; her husband and the estate (the Jacobsons) sued for wrongful death.
- Defendants moved to bifurcate the threshold employment issue (whether they were hospital employees) and requested a bench trial on that issue because if they were hospital employees the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) would bar the claim as untimely.
- The district court granted bifurcation and tried the employment issue to the court; it found defendants were employees and dismissed the complaint.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning the Jacobsons waived a jury trial by failing to timely object to the bifurcation ruling in the record.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review to decide (1) whether the Jacobsons waived their constitutional jury right and (2) whether they had a right to a jury on the issue whether the defendants were political subdivision employees.
- The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in finding waiver under the record, but affirmed overall because plaintiffs had no right to a jury on the political-subdivision/employee-status issue under the PSTCA framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jacobsons waived right to jury by failing to object to bifurcation pretrial | Jacobsons argued they did not clearly and unequivocally waive; they renewed objection before trial and never consented | Defendants argued silence before the court’s ruling waived the jury right and Court of Appeals correctly found waiver | Court: Court of Appeals erred — waiver in district court must fall within §25-1126 modes (written, oral in open court, or consent when other fails to appear); mere pretrial silence does not automatically waive jury right |
| Whether plaintiffs had a constitutional/statutory right to jury on whether defendants were political subdivision employees | Jacobsons: Because they did not sue the hospital under PSTCA, a jury should decide the factual employment issue | Defendants: Legislature sets terms of waiver of immunity; PSTCA’s terms treat employee-status determinations as for the court and do not include jury trial among waiver terms | Court: No right to jury on employee-status issue — PSTCA (and related principles on governmental immunity) means jury trial is not a term of the State’s consent to be sued; therefore bench determination was proper |
| Whether §25-1126 allows waiver to be implied by silence or non-objection | Jacobsons: silence/late objection did not amount to waiver; previous case law allows revival of jury demand | Defendants: Practical waiver rules and appellate record principles support presuming waiver when no timely objection is in record | Court: §25-1126 provides exclusive statutory modes of waiver in district court; waiver cannot be inferred from mere silence outside those modes |
| Whether legislative waiver of immunity can exclude jury trials | Jacobsons: constitutional jury right should preserve jury for common-law issues like negligence | Defendants: Legislature can condition consent to suit and prescribe procedures (including non-jury resolution) | Court: Legislature may set terms of waiver; if jury trial is not among those terms, plaintiffs are not entitled to jury on that issue |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Interest of Eden K., 14 Neb. App. 867 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (definition of clear and convincing evidence)
- ML Manager v. Jensen, 287 Neb. 171 (Neb. 2014) (statutory interpretation is question of law)
- Eihusen v. Eihusen, 272 Neb. 462 (Neb. 2006) (historical distinction between law and equity; jury right context)
- Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (U.S. 1981) (Seventh Amendment does not apply to the federal government; jury rights as terms of consent to be sued)
- Wilson v. Big Sandy Health Care, Inc., 576 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2009) (no jury on employment/scope-of-employment issue where statute makes that a matter of governmental exposure/consent)
- Livengood v. Nebraska State Patrol Retirement Sys., 273 Neb. 247 (Neb. 2007) (Legislature controls terms of waiver of sovereign immunity)
- Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430 (Neb. 1968) (governmental immunity doctrine applies to political subdivision employees acting within scope of employment)
- Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374 (Neb. 2011) (discussion of waiver and statutory construction principles)
- Lett v. Hammond, 59 Neb. 339 (Neb. 1899) (party may demand jury on appearance of docket even after pretrial procedural rulings)
- MFA Ins. Companies v. Mendelhall, 205 Neb. 430 (Neb. 1980) (presumption of waiver where parties try case to court without objection)
