Jacobs v. State
560 S.W.3d 205
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2018Background
- Defendant Joshua Jacobs was tried for aggravated sexual assault of a 12‑year‑old; DNA and forensic evidence linked him to the victim.
- Jacobs had a prior Louisiana conviction for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile; a conviction here would trigger an automatic life sentence and Article 38.37 evidence about prior sexual offenses.
- Jacobs sought to ask venire members, during Article 38.37 voir dire, whether knowledge of a prior "sexual offense" would affect their ability to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the trial judge barred the word "sexual" and allowed "felony," "assaultive," or simply "unrelated offense."
- Jacobs used "assaultive offenses" and "unrelated offenses" in voir dire; no veniremember indicated they would lower the State's burden.
- Jacobs was convicted, pleaded true to the enhancement, and received life. The court of appeals held the voir dire limitation was constitutional error and reversed; the State sought review limited to whether the error was constitutional in dimension.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jacobs) | Defendant's Argument (State/Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether forbidding the word "sexual" in Article 38.37 voir dire violated the right to an impartial jury | Limitation prevented probing specific bias against repeat sexual offenders and impeded identifying jurors for cause | Trial judge allowed general terms ("felony," "assaultive," "unrelated offense") which adequately exposed bias; specific term risked prejudicing panel | Court held no constitutional violation as to impartial jury—the limitation did not render the trial fundamentally unfair |
| Whether the restriction violated Texas right "of being heard by counsel" | Denial of a proper voir dire question infringed the right to be heard and counsel’s ability to probe juror bias | Easley allows reasonable voir dire limits; not every restriction is constitutional error | Court held Easley controls; right to be heard does not require broader questioning than federal due process; no constitutional error here |
| Standard for reviewing voir dire-question limitations | Jacobs/court of appeals treated limitation as constitutional error requiring Rule 44.2(a) analysis | State argued error (if any) was nonconstitutional and subject to harmless‑error review | Court clarified: apply federal standard (Mu’Min) — limitation is constitutional only if it renders trial fundamentally unfair; here, limitation was not constitutional error |
| Scope of Texas Constitution relative to federal Sixth Amendment regarding voir dire | Jacobs urged broader Texas protection to require specificity in voir dire questioning | Court: Texas provisions do not afford greater substantive voir dire rights than the federal Constitution; Easley preserved possibility of constitutional magnitude but not broader than federal | Court held Texas right to be heard and impartial jury do not demand more specific questioning than federal standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (failure to ask specific voir dire questions is constitutional only if it renders the trial fundamentally unfair)
- Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (trial court has broad discretion over voir dire topics and form)
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (capital cases may require specific questioning to expose automatic death‑penalty jurors)
- Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Texas should generally follow federal impartial‑jury standards)
- Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (limits on voir dire are not per se Texas constitutional violations; some may be constitutional in magnitude)
- Johnson v. State, 433 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (permitting general reference to unspecified felonies did not render cross‑examination for bias ineffective)