837 S.E.2d 76
Va. Ct. App.2020Background
- Jacob Chaney (husband) and Julia Karabaic-Chaney (wife) married in 2012 and separated in 2017; wife sued for divorce and requested equitable distribution, spousal support, child support, and attorney’s fees.
- Husband’s answer did not plead a counterclaim for divorce nor assert adultery as an affirmative defense.
- Wife moved in limine to exclude any evidence of her alleged adultery; the trial court granted the motion and barred adultery evidence “for any purpose” at deposition, hearing, or trial.
- The trial court held hearings and granted wife a one-year separation divorce, determined equitable distribution, ordered child support, and awarded spousal support of $45,000 payable over five years.
- Husband appealed, arguing the court erred by excluding adultery evidence for consideration under Code § 20-107.1(E), that the spousal support award lacked sufficient evidentiary support, and that the court improperly handled future modification rights. The Court of Appeals remanded on the adultery-evidence issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Karabaic-Chaney) | Defendant's Argument (Chaney) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence of alleged adultery may be considered in awarding spousal support when adultery was not pled as a ground or affirmative defense | Exclusion proper because adultery was not pled; when adultery is a ground for divorce, statute limits support to prevent awarding to adulterous spouse except in manifest injustice situations | Adultery evidence is a mandatory factor under Code § 20-107.1(E) and may be considered even if not pled as a ground or affirmative defense | Reversed: trial court erred; adultery evidence is admissible for spousal support consideration under § 20-107.1(E) even if not pled |
| Whether exclusion of adultery evidence constituted failure to consider all statutory spousal-support factors | Exclusion was proper procedural limitation | Exclusion meant the court failed to consider a mandatory factor, amounting to abuse of discretion | Reversed and remanded for rehearing on spousal support because the court failed to consider a required factor |
| Whether the trial court properly applied Code § 20-107.1(E)’s text and scope | Statutory scheme limits consideration of adultery to proceedings where adultery is pleaded as a ground | § 20-107.1(E)’s phrase “circumstances and factors…including adultery” requires courts to consider adultery as one of many possible contributing factors regardless of pleading | Court construed § 20-107.1(E) to require consideration of adultery evidence as part of the broader inquiry into factors contributing to dissolution |
| Need for remand and scope of appellate review | No remand necessary; evidentiary exclusion harmless | Because exclusion was legal error and failure to consider a mandatory factor, remand for rehearing on spousal support is required | Case reversed and remanded for rehearing on spousal support; other claims not decided on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Harman v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 288 Va. 84 (2014) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264 (1998) (trial court abuses discretion when it makes an error of law)
- Navas v. Navas, 43 Va. App. 484 (2004) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98 (1993) ("respective degrees of fault" includes all behavior affecting the marriage, not limited to legal divorce grounds)
- Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123 (1997) (trial courts must consider all Code § 20-107.1 factors; failure is reversible error)
- Campbell v. Harmon, 271 Va. 590 (2006) (plain statutory language controls legislative intent)