Jackson v. United States
14-397
Fed. Cl.Nov 20, 2017Background
- In 2013 the Surface Transportation Board (STB) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) for 14.9 miles of an inactive rail line in Newton County, GA, triggering rails‑to‑trails/railbanking procedures. Plaintiffs are 47 adjoining landowners who claim a Fifth Amendment taking from the NITU.
- The parcels trace to late‑19th/early‑20th century conveyances to Middle Georgia & Atlantic Railway (MGAR) and later Central of Georgia; the deeds fall into three main groups: MGAR form deeds (1890–1894), modified MGAR forms, and 1899 Porterdale spur deeds.
- Plaintiffs contend most original grants were easements limited to railroad use that reverted to fee when rail service ceased; government contends many grants conveyed fee simple or sufficiently broad easements including trail/railbanking.
- The legal takings question depends on state‑law property interests at the time the NITU issued: if owners held fee simples free of railroad easements, the NITU’s suspension of abandonment could have effectuated a taking.
- The court analyzed deed language in the context of contemporary Georgia statutes (Ga. Code provisions governing railroad incorporations and eminent domain) and Georgia case law, and allocated claims: some deeds construed as easements (favors Plaintiffs), some as fee simple (favors Government), and several parcels remain in dispute due to mapping or multiple deeds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature of original grants: easement vs. fee simple | Most MGAR/related deeds were "Right of Way" grants that conveyed easements limited to railroad use and thus reverted on abandonment | Many deeds convey a "strip/tract" with habendum/warranty language giving fee simple to railroad | Court: MGAR form and many modified MGAR deeds construed as easements; certain Porterdale deeds (Porter, Peek, Beebe, Webb, N.C. Lee) construed as fee simple; Clark deed construed as easement; several parcels reserved for trial (partial grant to both parties) |
| Whether deed language permitted future recreational‑trail (railbanking) use | "Any other use in discretion of Company" is broad and includes trail/railbanking | That phrase is bounded by the railroad's charter/statute and thus does not encompass recreational trails | Held: Easements construed as limited to railroad construction/operation; not broad enough to include public recreational trail use |
| Effect of NITU under Trails Act: did government action effect a taking? | If state law reversionary interests existed and were blocked by the NITU, a taking accrued on issuance | Government disputes if plaintiffs held reversionary fee interests at accrual; no taking if railway held fee or easement already broad enough | Held (as legal framework): NITU is the operative event that can effect a taking; liability depends on whether owners held compensable property (court resolved deed issues for many claims accordingly) |
| Parcel‑specific standing/adjacency disputes | Plaintiffs identify 47 parcel claims allegedly abutting/underlying corridor | Government challenges adjacency/ownership for several parcels (mapping, deeds) | Held: Summary judgment for defendant on one conceded out‑of‑NITU parcel (Betty Walton); several parcels (e.g., Miller, Smith, Greyland, Covington claims 32/34) require factual development re: maps/deeds and remain for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (Trails Act takings principled — government action converting railroad ROW to trail can give rise to just‑compensation claim)
- Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rails‑to‑trails: converting a railroad easement to trail use creates a new easement and may constitute a taking)
- Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (issuance of an NITU suspends abandonment and is the triggering government act for a Trails Act taking)
- Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explains reversion on abandonment and consequent property interests)
- Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discusses NITU's role in preventing state‑law reversionary interests)
- Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (state law governs existence/scope of property interests for takings analysis)
- Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs bear burden to establish cognizable property interests)
- Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (identifying requirement to plead a cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest)