Jackson v. TSA Processing Chicago, Inc.
2021 IL App (2d) 200769
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2021Background
- Jackson was employed operating a metal‑cutting machine and has congenital ectodermal dysplasia (impaired sweating / risk of hyperthermia).
- From Jan 7, 2013 until July 18, 2013 Jackson performed adequately; on July 18 he overheated in unusually extreme workplace heat, asked to leave, was instructed to wait, left for safety, and was fired that day.
- Jackson filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Aug 27, 2013); the Department initially dismissed (Jan 12, 2018), the Human Rights Commission vacated and remanded, and the Department issued a Notice of Substantial Evidence on Dec 31, 2018.
- The Dec 31, 2018 notice was mailed to Jackson’s prior address and (Jackson alleges) not received; the Department mailed an amended/corrected notice on May 6, 2019, which Jackson received and then filed this civil suit on July 22, 2019.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under the Code (timeliness under section 2‑619 and legal sufficiency under section 2‑615 / 2‑619.1), arguing the 90‑day filing period ran from presumed receipt five days after Dec 31, 2018, and that Jackson was not a "disability"-protected employee because his condition affected his ability to work in hot July conditions.
- The trial court dismissed with prejudice (untimely and not disabled); the appellate court reversed and remanded, finding factual disputes about receipt of notice and that Jackson adequately pleaded disability and potential reasonable accommodation.
Issues
| Issue | Jackson's Argument | TSA / Tresten's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of suit under 775 ILCS 5/7A‑102(D)(4) | Dec 31, 2018 notice was mailed to old address and not received; the operative notice was the May 6, 2019 mailing, so suit filed July 22, 2019 was timely | Receipt is presumed five days after mailing (irrebuttable); Jackson’s suit was filed well after that 90‑day period and is untimely | Reversed: presumption of receipt is rebuttable; factual dispute (returned mail, corrected mailing) precluded dismissal on timeliness without an evidentiary hearing |
| Whether Jackson pleaded a "disability" under 775 ILCS 5/1‑103(I) (and that it is unrelated to ability to perform job) | Ectodermal dysplasia is a determinable congenital condition; Jackson performed job for six months and requested a one‑day accommodation for unusual heat — he could perform duties with reasonable accommodation | Jackson’s inability to work safely in hot July weather shows disability related to job duties, so not protected | Reversed: at pleading stage Jackson plausibly alleged a disability and that reasonable accommodation might permit safe performance; dismissal under section 2‑615 improper |
| Defendants’ failure to label portions of motion under 735 ILCS 5/2‑619.1 | Defendants’ omission hindered procedural clarity | Motion still intelligible; omission harmless | Appellate court agreed with trial court that omission was not prejudicial; issue need not be reached further given reversals on main issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 207 Ill. 2d 359 (2003) (de novo review applies to section 2‑619 dismissal)
- Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422 (2006) (section 2‑615 dismissal standard; accept well‑pleaded facts and reasonable inferences)
- Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381 (2005) (pleadings and judicial admissions limit scope of rule 2‑615 review)
- Harton v. City of Chicago Dep’t of Public Works, 301 Ill. App. 3d 378 (1998) (plaintiff unable to perform duties even with accommodation is not disabled under Act)
- Constant v. Turris Coal Co., 199 Ill. App. 3d 214 (1990) (reasonable accommodation can make otherwise dangerous work safe and implicate Act)
- Van Campen v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 326 Ill. App. 3d 963 (2001) (extensive attendance/ability problems can show inability to perform job despite accommodation)
- Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 190 Ill. App. 3d 1036 (1989) (transfer or schedule changes can be reasonable accommodations)
- Gemini Servs., Inc. v. Martin, 141 Ill. App. 3d 17 (1986) (distinguishing regulatory language that creates rebuttable vs. irrebuttable presumptions)
- In re Amanda D., 349 Ill. App. 3d 941 (2004) (irrebuttable presumptions disfavored where due process concerns exist)