Jackson v. Trammell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19626

Background

In 1997 Shelton Jackson was charged with murdering his girlfriend Monica Decator, arson, and injuring her two‑year‑old son; he was convicted and initially sentenced to death, which was vacated on appeal for counsel error, and retried in 2003.
At retrial the jury convicted Jackson of first‑degree murder and found three aggravating circumstances: heinous/atrocious/cruel, avoiding arrest/prosecution, and knowingly creating a great risk of death to more than one person (the last based on the injured child); one alleged aggravator (continuing threat) was dismissed by the court.
The prosecution relied in part on a treating physician’s testimony about the child’s severe injuries; defense mitigation focused on Jackson’s adverse childhood, fetal alcohol effects, and a character witness, Arthur Farahkhan.
Farahkhan had previously warned defense counsel he believed the death penalty could be appropriate in some premeditated murder cases; on cross‑examination at the retrial he agreed the death penalty would be appropriate if Jackson intentionally killed Decator, and defense counsel did not object or rehabilitate him.
Jackson raised federal habeas claims challenging (1) submission of the great‑risk aggravator, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to control Farahkhan’s testimony and to object, and (3) cumulative error; the district court denied relief and the Tenth Circuit granted a COA on the ineffective assistance claim and expanded it to include the aggravator claim.

Issues

Issue	Jackson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Validity/submission of the "great risk of death" aggravator	Aggravator improper because the child’s injuries were temporally and spatially remote from the homicide so the homicidal act did not create a contemporaneous risk to another person	The child was injured in the same transaction and Decator (as mother) was the only person likely to find him, so the murder created a great risk to the child; evidence also supported the avoid‑arrest aggravator	Court declined to decide validity; held OCCA reasonably applied Brown v. Sanders to conclude any error was not outcome‑determinative because same evidence supported a valid aggravator (avoid‑arrest)
Applicability of Brown v. Sanders (whether Sanders applies in weighing states)	Sanders applies only to non‑weighing states; Oklahoma (a weighing state) should still trigger automatic reversal for an invalid eligibility factor	Sanders abolished the weighing/non‑weighing dichotomy and announced a uniform rule; Sanders applies to weighing states too	Held Sanders announces a uniform rule for both weighing and non‑weighing states; OCCA relied on correct clearly established federal law
Distinction between admissibility of evidence and use as aggravating weight	Even if evidence was admissible generally, the child‑injury testimony could not properly be given aggravating weight under the avoid‑arrest aggravator because it did not show what Jackson knew	The degree of the child’s injuries bears on what Jackson knew and his motive to avoid arrest; if evidence could support the avoid‑arrest factor, it could be given aggravating weight	Held OCCA’s conclusion—that the physician’s testimony could properly support the avoid‑arrest aggravator and thus supply aggravating weight—was objectively reasonable
Ineffective assistance for failing to object to Farahkhan’s cross‑examination and not rehabilitating him	Defense silence allowed a witness to state the death penalty would be appropriate if Jackson intentionally killed Decator, prejudicing mitigation and constituting deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland	Trial strategy to call Farahkhan was reasonable; OCCA found no prejudice because the record contained overwhelming aggravation and substantial mitigation—no reasonable probability of a different result	Held habeas relief denied: under doubly deferential Strickland/AEDPA review, OCCA’s denial was reasonable and no prejudice shown

Key Cases Cited

Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006) (announces rule that an invalidated sentencing factor does not require reversal if other valid factors permit the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (explains doubly deferential standard when §2254(d) and Strickland both apply)
Jackson v. State, 146 P.3d 1149 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (OCCA decision on Jackson’s direct appeal after retrial)
Hanson v. State, 206 P.3d 1020 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) (articulates Oklahoma’s understanding of the great‑risk aggravator)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (defines “clearly established Federal law” standard under §2254)