JACKSON v. RAFFENSPERGER, 308 Ga. 736

In June 2018 Mary Jackson and nonprofit ROSE sued the Georgia Secretary of State, challenging the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act, which makes it unlawful to provide "lactation care and services" for compensation without a state license. Only IBCLCs are eligible for the mandatory license.
The Act defines lactation care broadly to include virtually all work LCs perform, and it contains limited exemptions (certain health professionals, doulas’ educational functions, students/interns under supervision, certain government employees, and uncompensated volunteers).
Two primary private certifications exist: CLC (45-hour course + exam; >800 in GA; more available in rural/minority areas) and IBCLC (extensive coursework and supervised clinical hours; ~335 in GA; concentrated in urban/hospital settings).
The Occupational Regulation Review Council opposed an earlier 2013 licensure proposal because it found no public-safety evidence and concluded excluding most private credentials would reduce access; despite that, a similar Act passed in 2016 without Council review.
The trial court granted a 12(b)(6) dismissal, ruling the Georgia Constitution does not protect a right to pursue one’s chosen profession and that plaintiffs were not similarly situated to IBCLCs. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed both dismissals and remanded for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Substantive due process: Does the Georgia Constitution protect the right to pursue a lawful occupation free from unreasonable government interference?	Jackson: Yes; the Act unreasonably interferes with the right to pursue lactation practice without an IBCLC license.	Secretary/trial court: No constitutional right to practice a chosen profession (trial court relied on Court of Appeals precedent).	Court: Georgia Constitution protects the right to pursue a lawful occupation; trial court erred to dismiss on that ground.
Equal protection: Are non-IBCLC LCs (e.g., CLCs) similarly situated to IBCLCs for equal protection purposes?	Jackson: CLCs and IBCLCs perform the same work and are equally competent; excluding CLCs treats similarly situated persons differently.	Trial court: Plaintiffs not similarly situated because their credential prerequisites differ.	Court: At the 12(b)(6) stage, plaintiffs plausibly alleged they are similarly situated; dismissal was erroneous.

Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826 (1939) (struck down occupational licensing regime for photographers under Georgia due process).
Jenkins v. Manry, 216 Ga. 538 (1961) (invalidated unreasonable licensing requirements for plumbers; recognizes constitutional protection for pursuing occupation).
Waller v. State Const. Indus. Licensing Bd., 250 Ga. 529 (1983) (upheld principle that occupation-related licensing must be reasonable under Georgia Constitution).
Baranan v. State Bd. of Nursing Home Administrators, 143 Ga. App. 605 (1977) (court acknowledged right to practice a profession but held the right is subject to reasonable regulatory limits).
Brown v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 190 Ga. App. 311 (1989) (Court of Appeals decision that was disapproved in part by the Supreme Court for suggesting no constitutional right to practice a profession).
Walker v. Cromartie, 287 Ga. 511 (2010) (explains that an equal protection claimant must first allege being similarly situated to those treated differently).