148 F. Supp. 3d 152
D. Mass.2015Background
- David Jackson was convicted (Mass. Superior Court, Suffolk County) of armed robbery, burglary, and first‑degree murder; he seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- At trial the prosecutor told the jury that witness/co‑defendant Steven Olbinsky was a defendant charged with first‑degree murder and that the Commonwealth had made no promises or rewards for his testimony.
- Two weeks after Jackson’s trial a first‑degree murder indictment against Olbinsky was dismissed; subsequently Oregon prosecutors noted they were “trying to work with prosecutors in Boston to treat [Olbinsky] nicely” in Oregon drug proceedings.
- Jackson argues (1) the prosecutor’s remark improperly bolstered Olbinsky’s credibility and (2) the Commonwealth violated Brady by failing to disclose its advocacy for favorable treatment of Olbinsky in Oregon.
- The Massachusetts SJC rejected both claims on the merits after multiple post‑conviction motions; Jackson exhausted state remedies and sought federal habeas relief.
- The district court applied AEDPA deference, found the SJC’s outcomes were not unreasonable in light of the record (including independent evidence linking Jackson to the crime and Olbinsky’s prior consistent statements), denied habeas relief, and denied an evidentiary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutor’s statement that Olbinsky was "on trial" impermissibly bolstered witness credibility | Jackson: prosecutor misled jury by implying Olbinsky would be prosecuted for murder, unlawfully enhancing his credibility | Commonwealth: any error was harmless given corroborating evidence and Olbinsky’s prior consistent statements; SJC already rejected the claim | Court: AEDPA bars relief — SJC decision not an unreasonable application of federal law; harmless‑error rationale plausible |
| Brady nondisclosure of Commonwealth’s advocacy for favorable treatment of Olbinsky in Oregon | Jackson: Commonwealth’s undisclosed efforts/leniency discussions were favorable impeachment evidence and material under Brady/Giglio | Commonwealth/SJC: the undisclosed information was not material; admission would not have created reasonable probability of a different result | Court: AEDPA bars relief — SJC’s materiality determination reasonable in view of other evidence; no Brady violation warranting habeas relief |
| Request for an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) | Jackson: seeks hearing to develop Brady evidence (Oregon file, affidavits) | Commonwealth: record reviewed by state courts; Pinholster limits federal evidentiary development when claim adjudicated on merits | Court: Denied — § 2254(d) bars relief on the existing record so § 2254(e)(2) cannot authorize an evidentiary hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (emphasizes reviewing what arguments could have supported the state court outcome)
- Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (harmless‑error standard for habeas review)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (impeachment evidence and plea/deal disclosure requirements)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits federal evidentiary development where claim adjudicated on the merits in state court)
- Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (state court declination to re‑reach merits does not bar federal habeas review)
- McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. en banc on AEDPA review standards and state court findings under more defendant‑friendly state law)