Jackson v. Marshall
864 F.3d 1
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- In April 1990 a robbery/shooting occurred in Boston; no physical evidence tied David Jackson to the crime. The Commonwealth's chief witness, Steven Olbinsky, gave statements shortly after the crime and testified at Jackson's 1993 trial placing Jackson at or near the scene and describing him with a shotgun and trench coat. Other witnesses provided corroborating, though not identification, testimony.
- At trial the prosecutor and Olbinsky both told the jury that Olbinsky had received no promises, inducements, or deals in exchange for his testimony; the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized that any deal would have been known to the defense.
- Olbinsky had been indicted alongside Jackson but his murder indictment was repeatedly continued, the Commonwealth did not oppose a motion to dismiss, and his indictment was dismissed shortly after Jackson’s trial. Post-trial materials revealed a Massachusetts–Oregon interaction in which Oregon authorities were asked to "treat [Olbinsky] nicely" and later dismissed serious Oregon drug charges against him, leaving only a probation sentence.
- Jackson pursued state and federal collateral review asserting Brady and due process claims based on: (a) alleged non-disclosure of a bail agreement and the Commonwealth’s interventions in Oregon; and (b) prosecutorial misrepresentations and subornation of perjury by allowing Olbinsky to deny inducements. The SJC rejected his Rule 30 motions; federal district courts denied habeas relief and declined an evidentiary hearing; this appeal followed.
- The SJC found (1) Olbinsky’s accounts were materially consistent from July 1990 through trial; (2) defense counsel had impeached him on other grounds; and (3) other witnesses’ testimony corroborated key details. The SJC and the federal courts concluded the suppressed/after‑discovered materials were not sufficiently material to require a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Jackson's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady/Impeachment nondisclosure: prosecution failed to disclose interventions, bail agreement, and other favorable evidence about Olbinsky | Non‑disclosure deprived him of impeachment evidence that would have shown Olbinsky testified under inducement and would have affected the verdict | Evidence was either discoverable pretrial, not a promise/deal, or not material: consistent prior statements and corroborating testimony negate prejudice | SJC and federal courts reasonably found no Brady violation: not materially likely to change the outcome under prevailing standards; habeas denied |
| Prosecutorial misrepresentation / subornation of perjury: prosecutor and Olbinsky lied that no inducements existed; if perjury was knowingly used a lower materiality standard applies | No direct evidence that prosecutors promised anything; record supports finding Olbinsky did not perjure himself; Oregon actions reflect cooperation between jurisdictions, not inducement | Court held SJC reasonably concluded no subornation of perjury and therefore applied ordinary materiality test; no relief under Agurs/Giglio standard | |
| Materiality standard to apply (Agurs/Bagley/Giglio/Strickler): whether the lower perjury-based standard applied | Jackson: evidence shows knowing use of false testimony so Agurs/Giglio standard (any reasonable likelihood of effect) should apply | Commonwealth: record lacks proof of knowing perjury; SJC applied Tucceri/Strickler‑style materiality and reasonably so | Held: AEDPA deference applies; SJC's materiality determination was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law |
| Evidentiary hearing / supplementation of record under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2) | Jackson sought an evidentiary hearing to develop alleged deals/inducements after discovery revealed new materials | Commonwealth and courts: state court adjudicated claims on the merits and Jackson cannot satisfy §2254(d) on the state‑court record, so Pinholster bars expansion | Held: District Court did not abuse discretion; no §2254(e)(2) hearing because petitioner cannot overcome §2254(d) on the record before the state court |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (establishes prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (Brady duty extends to impeachment evidence)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (materiality standards and perjury context)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (prosecution use of perjured testimony and disclosure of deals)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady materiality: reasonable probability of different result)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA deference standard for federal habeas)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits federal evidentiary development when state court adjudicated merits)
- Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (materiality analysis under Brady)
- Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590 (1st Cir. discussion of differing materiality standards in perjury contexts)
- Perkins v. Russo, 586 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. on prosecutorial inducement of perjury and materiality)