Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia
327 F. Supp. 3d 52
| D.C. Cir. | 2018Background
- On May 5, 2015, Elijah Jackson, driving intoxicated, struck a moped, fled, and was stopped and arrested by D.C. police; he later underwent neck surgery and claims PTSD from the incident.
- Jackson alleges officers (Merzig, Fogle, Braithwaite, Hillgren, Bolton, Smith) used excessive force — beating and repeated pepper-spraying; officers contend Jackson was combative and resisted, justifying a tactical takedown and pepper spray.
- Sergeant Harrison arrived after Jackson was handcuffed, conducted the initial review, and transported Jackson to the hospital; he is accused only of investigative failings, not of participating in force.
- Jackson was criminally convicted of assaulting two officers (Merzig and Fogle) and fleeing; acquitted as to Braithwaite.
- Jackson retained an expert (former police chief Longo) who criticized D.C. Police post-2008 policies and investigative practices, opining there was a de facto tolerance of inadequate use-of-force investigations but declined to find an official policy of excessive force.
- Procedural posture: Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings and partial summary judgment; the Court granted in part and denied in part (dismissed Fifth Amendment claim, granted judgment for Harrison and on certain claims, denied as to other officers and claims; granted summary judgment to D.C. on municipal liability).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim may proceed for alleged excessive force | Jackson asserts Fifth Amendment claim for excessive force | Defendants: excessive-force claims in arrests/stops are governed by Fourth Amendment | Dismissed: Graham controls — Fourth Amendment governs excessive-force-in-seizure claims; Fifth Amendment claim is duplicative |
| Whether individual officers (Bolton, Smith, Braithwaite, Hillgren, Harrison) are liable under § 1983 (Fourth Amendment excessive force) | Jackson: officers personally participated or are liable as bystanders/failure-to-intervene | Defendants: several officers did not participate; Harrison arrived after events | Partial denial: Braithwaite & Hillgren — genuine disputes on participation; Bolton & Smith — genuine issues as to takedown and bystander liability; Harrison — summary judgment for Harrison (no factual basis for liability) |
| Whether common-law assault and battery claim survives against individual officers | Jackson: officers committed battery via excessive force | Defendants: some officers did not personally use force; handcuffing and takedown lawful if resistance | Mixed: Claim proceeds against Braithwaite & Hillgren; Harrison dismissed; Bolton & Smith survive on claim only if jury finds their takedown was excessive (no pleaded theory of vicarious liability) |
| Whether municipal liability (Monell) exists for D.C. based on alleged inadequate investigation of use-of-force (failure to train/supervise/deliberate indifference & causation) | Jackson (via expert): post-MOA policy changes and deficient investigations created de facto policy of tolerating inadequate investigations, causing constitutional violations | Defendants: policies and investigations (including required IA triggers for hospitalization/broken bones) were adequate; Longo’s opinions are speculative and do not show deliberate indifference or causation | Grant: Summary judgment for D.C. — plaintiff failed to show deliberate indifference or that investigative practices were the moving force causing Jackson’s injuries |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (excessive-force claims during seizures are governed by Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability requires an official policy, custom, or deliberate indifference)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (U.S. 2011) (deliberate indifference standard and requirement of pattern or obvious deficiency for single-incident municipal liability)
- Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 893 F.3d 802 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (application of Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis; qualified-immunity context)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (individual § 1983 liability requires each official’s personal acts/knowledge)
- Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (ways municipal policy or custom can give rise to § 1983 liability)