Jackson v. Coons
17-5041
| 10th Cir. | Nov 22, 2017Background
- Richard and Barbara Coons bought property from Patricia Howie and agreed to pay her mortgage; they made payments and accessed the mortgage account online.
- Howie attempted to cancel the transaction and block the Coonses’ online access; the Coonses sued and obtained a state-court order prohibiting interference.
- Later loss of online access recurred; Roy L. Jackson (allegedly Howie’s attorney-in-fact) and Howie were found in contempt by the state court for interfering with the account.
- Jackson sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging a conspiracy by Mr. Coons, attorney David Dryer, and Dryer & Associates to deprive him of First Amendment rights by impairing his ability to manage the mortgage account; he also asserted state-law claims.
- The district court dismissed the § 1985(3) claims for lack of any alleged state action and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; it later denied Jackson’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter the judgment asserting he could plead state action with discovery and in a proposed second amended complaint.
- Jackson appealed pro se, but his notice of appeal designated only the order denying the Rule 59(e) motion, limiting appellate review to that post-judgment order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jackson’s notice of appeal preserved review of the original dismissal | Jackson appealed the post-judgment order and intended to challenge dismissal | Appellees: notice named only the Rule 59(e) order, so earlier dismissal is not appealed | Court: Notice designated only April 7, 2017 order; appellate jurisdiction limited to denial of Rule 59(e) motion |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 59(e) relief | Jackson argued he needed discovery and his proposed second amended complaint pleaded state action | Defendants: facts and arguments were available earlier; amendment can’t rescue deficient pleadings post-judgment | Denial affirmed: Jackson should have raised state-action allegations earlier; reconsideration cannot raise arguments available earlier |
| Whether the proposed second amended complaint plausibly alleged § 1985(3) state action | Jackson asserted state action via defendants’ conduct and bar membership/organization under state law | Defendants: their conduct (private representation) is purely private and does not constitute state action | Court: Proposed pleading fails to plausibly allege state action; § 1985(3) claim deficient |
| Whether Jackson could proceed under § 1983 against the attorney-defendants | Jackson raised § 1983 in reply brief | Defendants: attorney representation is not action under color of state law | Argument waived for late presentation; alternatively, § 1983 fails because private counsel’s litigation conduct is not state action |
Key Cases Cited
- United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (recognizing state-action element for § 1985(3) First Amendment claims)
- Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1993) (state-action requirement for § 1985(3) First Amendment claims)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must state a plausible claim for relief)
- Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 (motion for reconsideration cannot raise arguments available earlier)
- Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (Rule 3 notice-of-appeal requirements are jurisdictional)
- Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir.) (attorney’s litigation conduct not action under color of state law for § 1983)
- Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462 (private attorney-client litigation is private activity insufficient for § 1985(3))