Jackson v. Conway
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15589
| 2d Cir. | 2014Background
- In November 2000 Shawn A. Jackson was arrested after three family members alleged multiple sexual assaults (including his 14-year-old daughter CJ); police collected sheets and sexual-assault kits but the State introduced little physical corroboration at trial.
- While in custody and after invoking his Miranda right to remain silent, Jackson was interviewed at the police station by Kathy Bonisteel, a Child Protective Services (CPS) caseworker, without Miranda warnings; he acknowledged it was “possible” he was so drunk he couldn’t remember raping CJ.
- At trial the State elicited Bonisteel’s testimony about Jackson’s statements and attempted to introduce expert medical testimony through Dr. Ann Lenane despite representing pretrial it would not call an expert; the court later struck/ directed the jury to disregard some of that testimony.
- Jackson was convicted on 47 counts (later reduced sentence), and on direct appeal the New York Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting his Miranda, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective-assistance claims.
- On federal habeas review the magistrate judge granted relief: (1) found the state court’s Miranda ruling unreasonable and vacated convictions related to CJ, (2) found cumulative prosecutorial misconduct requiring vacatur of all convictions, and (3) granted limited relief on some ineffective-assistance theories; the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jackson) | Defendant's Argument (Conway/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Miranda to CPS interview | Bonisteel acted as functional equivalent of law enforcement; her custodial questioning required Miranda warnings | Bonisteel was conducting a separate civil child-protection inquiry and not engaged in law-enforcement interrogation | Court: State court’s rejection was an unreasonable application of Miranda/Mathis/Smith; Bonisteel’s custodial questioning was interrogation and her testimony admitting Jackson’s inculpatory remark violated Miranda as to counts involving CJ (those convictions vacated) |
| Prejudice/harmlessness of admitted Bonisteel statements | Admission of the unwarned statement was not harmless given weak physical evidence regarding CJ and prosecutor’s mischaracterization in summation | Statement was cumulative or harmless given other testimony and jailhouse statements | Court: Error was not harmless for counts involving CJ (substantial and injurious effect), but did not warrant vacatur of non-CJ counts (no prejudicial spillover) |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (summation, late witness disclosure, expert testimony) | Prosecutor’s conduct pervaded trial (vouching, inflammatory language, breached expert notice, delayed disclosure to prompt change in counsel) and denied due process | State: many remarks supported by record; trial judge gave curative instructions; fair-minded jurists could disagree | Court: Magistrate judge erred to the extent he found AEDPA-unreasonable application; appellate court reversed grant of habeas on this claim — Fourth Dept’s rejection was within AEDPA deference given curative instructions and context |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (investigation, experts, use of lab/DNA) | Trial counsel failed to investigate, consult/call medical expert, or introduce exculpatory lab/DNA evidence; deficient performance prejudiced outcome | State: Fourth Dept. decided on the merits; many actions were reasonable strategy, and petitioner cannot show Strickland prejudice; district court relied on extra-record evidence contrary to Pinholster | Court: Affirmed denial of relief on these ineffective-assistance claims — Fourth Dept’s conclusion that counsel had plausible strategic reasons was not an unreasonable application of Strickland; state-record review sufficed |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police must give warnings before custodial interrogation to protect Fifth Amendment privilege)
- Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (Miranda applies to nonpolice interrogations that may lead to criminal prosecution)
- Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (pretrial psychiatric exam used at sentencing implicated Fifth Amendment; examiner acted as state agent when testifying)
- Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (post-invocation questioning is permissible only if Miranda rights scrupulously honored)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (interrogation includes words or actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutorial remarks violate due process only if they so infect the trial as to make conviction fundamentally unfair)
- Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (prosecutorial comments reviewed under due-process standard for unfairness)
- Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (prosecutor must avoid methods likely to produce wrongful conviction; persistent misconduct can require new trial)
- United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (contextual review of prosecutor’s comments, including invited responses, informs harmlessness)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (habeas relief requires substantial and injurious effect or influence on jury’s verdict)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state-court adjudication is presumed reasonable; "unreasonable application" is a high bar)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (AEDPA review under §2254(d)(1) is limited to the state-court record)