297 So.3d 250
Miss.2020Background
- Vernon Walters was injured in a 2006 work-related train collision; he received $195,471.66 in workers’ compensation and (with his wife Donyell) sued Kansas City Southern Railway Co. (KCSR) as a third-party defendant.
- The federal court dismissed the KCSR suit with prejudice in 2010 for Vernon’s false deposition testimony and the Parsons attorney’s discovery failures; Tadd Parsons did not tell the Walterses the case was dismissed.
- Over two years later Tadd fabricated a $104,000 settlement offer from KCSR, advised the Walterses to accept, and they did; the falsity was later discovered and the Walterses sued Tadd, Jack Parsons, and the Parsons Law Firm for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the Walterses on liability for fraud and IIED as to Tadd and the firm (Jack potentially vicariously liable); the damages phase went to a jury limited to damages.
- The jury awarded $2,850,002 in compensatory damages; the trial judge found the award excessive, entered a remittitur to $1,134,666.67, and Parsons appealed (Walters cross-appealed to reinstate the jury verdict).
- The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence about the KCSR proceedings, concluded the record did not support the remitted damages award, reversed the remitted judgment, and remanded for a new trial on damages; the Walterses’ cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Walters) | Defendant's Argument (Parsons) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by granting the motion in limine excluding Vernon’s deposition and other KCSR-case evidence | Exclusion proper because evidence was irrelevant to damages for fraud and IIED and prejudicial | Evidence was probative of the underlying claim’s value and thus relevant to quantify damages and mitigation | Motion in limine properly granted; KCSR evidence was irrelevant to the damages limited to fraud/IIED from the fabricated settlement |
| Whether the jury’s damages award (and the trial court’s remitted award) were supported by substantial evidence | Testimony and circumstances (fabrication, deceit, upset) justified the jury award | Award was speculative, punitive in nature, and unsupported by proof of compensable emotional distress or measurable reliance losses | The record lacked sufficient evidence to support the remitted compensatory award; damages were excessive — reversed and remanded for new trial on damages |
| Whether the jury verdict should be reinstated on cross-appeal after remittitur | Jury verdict should be reinstated | Trial court’s remittitur appropriate given pleading limits and weight-of-evidence concerns | Cross-appeal dismissed as moot because remitted award was reversed and case remanded for new damages trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brent, 133 So. 3d 760 (Miss. 2013) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- APAC–Miss., Inc. v. Goodman, 803 So. 2d 1177 (Miss. 2002) (Rule 401 favors admission if evidence has probative value)
- U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. of Miss. v. Martin, 998 So. 2d 956 (Miss. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion standard for remittitur review)
- Community Bank, Ellisville, Miss. v. Courtney, 884 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 2004) (courts will not disturb jury award absent insufficient proof)
- Cook v. Children’s Med. Group, P.A., 756 So. 2d 734 (Miss. 1999) (fraud permits recovery for reliance damages and emotional distress)
- Gamble ex rel. Gamble v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 852 So. 2d 5 (Miss. 2003) (examples of compensable emotional-distress evidence without expert testimony)
- Whitten v. Cox, 799 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2000) (standards and examples for emotional-distress awards)
- Morrison v. Means, 680 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1996) (insufficient proof of injury defeats large mental-anguish recovery)
- Stewart v. Gulf Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 846 So. 2d 192 (Miss. 2002) (medical testimony and corroboration can sustain large emotional-distress awards)
- Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1995) (defendant’s mental state considerations for emotional-distress damages)
