Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. Partnership v. Roger T. Fridholm Revocable, Living Trust
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 4312
Tex. App.2014Background
- Judgment creditors (Fridholm Trust and IPG) obtained default money judgments against Elizabeth Moore and sought to collect from her interest in the Jack M. Sanders Family Limited Partnership (FLP) by agreed charging order against Moore’s partnership interest.
- The charging order (Nov. 2011) directed FLP to pay distributions otherwise due Moore to the creditors until the judgments were paid.
- Subsequent events: a county court later valued Moore’s FLP interest at 2.07% and the IRS accepted payment from a third-party (Jones Trust) to satisfy federal tax liens and obtained an assignment of Moore’s interest.
- FLP moved to discharge and release the charging order (May 2013); creditors sought a turnover order and receiver. FLP intervened to oppose turnover/receiver.
- Eight days after FLP intervened, the trial court denied FLP’s motion to discharge the charging order without findings and without disposing of other pending requests (turnover, receiver). FLP appealed that denial.
- The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding the denial was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s denial of FLP’s motion to discharge the charging order is a final, appealable judgment | The denial finally disposed of the only remaining issue (whether to discharge the charging order) and is therefore appealable | The order is interlocutory and did not resolve all pending claims; appeal not authorized | Not final or appealable; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether a charging order is equivalent to a turnover/garnishment or mandatory injunction (making it independently appealable) | Charging order functions like turnover/garnishment or mandatory injunction and thus is appealable | Charging order is statutory remedy that does not resolve underlying property rights or impose clear obligations and is not appealable absent statutory authorization | Charging order here did not operate as a mandatory injunction and is not independently appealable |
| Whether the trial court’s order resolved FLP’s obligations after Moore’s alleged transfer of her interest | FLP: nothing left to decide but discharge; order therefore final | Creditors: questions remain about current ownership and collection mechanisms; standing and other issues unresolved | Record lacked findings on ownership/obligations; order left open material issues, so not final |
| Whether appellate jurisdiction can be conferred by parties’ agreement | FLP argued parties’ positions render order final | Respondents agreed order was final but contested merits/standing | Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement; court must independently determine finality |
Key Cases Cited
- CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (general rule that appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments)
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (final judgment requirement: disposes of all claims and parties or states intent to do so)
- Dispensa v. Univ. State Bank, 951 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1997) (charging order that leaves other relief unresolved is interlocutory and not appealable)
- Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, 810 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1991) (post-judgment order is appealable as mandatory injunction only if it resolves property rights and imposes obligations)
- Rosedale Partners, Ltd. v. 131st Judicial District Court, 869 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1994) (default judgment containing a charging order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of all claims and parties)