Jack E. Miller v. Boyd Wyatt, 457 S.W.3d 405

Miller, a former Crossville City Manager, sues Councilman Wyatt for defamation over Wyatt’s statement at a City Council meeting that Miller was discharged for misappropriating funds and not following procedures.
Wyatt moves for summary judgment arguing legislative privilege under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(b)(2) and common-law privilege; the trial court grants summary judgment.
Court holds Wyatt’s statement occurred in the course of conducting City Council affairs and is protected by legislative privilege.
Miller appeals asserting the privilege does not apply and that Wyatt failed to comply with Rule 56.03 timing and specificity.
Issa v. Benson and Cornett v. Fetzer are used to analyze the scope of legislative privilege; the meeting was regular and recorded, supporting privilege.
Judgment is affirmed on appeal; costs awarded to Miller and case remanded for costs collection.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether summary judgment was proper on legislative privilege grounds	Miller: privilege does not apply; statement not within council affairs	Wyatt: statement arose from council affairs and within legislative function	Yes; the statement arose from council affairs and is privileged
Whether Rule 56.03 compliance invalidates summary judgment	Miller: Wyatt failed to provide specific citations in time	Wyatt complied or court could waive rule	No; trial court properly exercised discretion to proceed

Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1998) (absolute local legislative immunity for legislative activities)
Cornett v. Fetzer, 604 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (absolute privilege for remarks within scope of city council matters)
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1951) (purpose of immunity; intent not controlling; focus on nature of act)
Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2013) (recognizes courts may decide as a matter of law whether statements are privileged)