Jacinta Downing v. Abbott Laboratories, 48 F.4th 793

Background

Jacinta (Jay) Downing, an African‑American regional sales manager at Abbott Molecular, was given mixed performance reviews, placed on a performance‑improvement plan (PIP), and ultimately was separated in a 2015 reduction‑in‑force; Abbott invited her to apply for a restructured director role but she was not hired.
Peter Farmakis (National Sales Director) supervised Downing beginning in 2012 and documented performance concerns; Downing and two coworkers complained about his management style and alleged discrimination; Abbott investigated via an anonymized climate survey.
Downing filed EEOC charges and later sued under § 1981 and Title VII alleging racial discrimination and retaliation (she dropped/failed to pursue sex‑discrimination and hostile‑work‑environment claims on appeal).
The district court denied most of Abbott’s summary‑judgment motion but granted summary judgment on Downing’s disparate‑impact claim (small sample) and excluded expert testimony (Dr. Destiny Peery) and several evidence items via motions in limine; a two‑week jury trial resulted in a defense verdict.
On appeal Downing challenged numerous evidentiary exclusions, the Daubert ruling excluding her expert, several refused jury instructions (including stereotyping and spoliation), admission of testimony by former supervisor Chris Jowett (and denial of a mistrial), and the grant of summary judgment on disparate impact.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed: it held the district court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary and instruction rulings, properly excluded the expert, and correctly granted summary judgment on the disparate‑impact claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Evidentiary exclusions (pretext witnesses, comparator evidence, climate survey excerpts, demographic statistics)	Downing: excluded evidence was material to show pretext, comparators, and a pattern of racial bias; exclusion denied fair trial.	Abbott: excluded items were irrelevant, cumulative, confusing, or prejudicial; decisionmakers relied on different sources; stats did not show involuntary departures.	Court: no abuse of discretion; most excluded evidence was irrelevant to what decisionmakers knew, cumulative, or insufficiently probative.
Expert testimony (Dr. Destiny Peery on stereotyping/implicit bias)	Downing: Peery’s social‑psychology opinions would help explain stereotyping and bias in employment decisions.	Abbott: Peery’s methodology was unreliable and her opinions were speculative and not tied to the facts of this case.	Court: affirmed exclusion under Rule 702/Daubert — methodology unreliable and testimony would not help the jury (too speculative).
Jury instructions (statutory text, circumstantial‑evidence examples, stereotyping instruction, spoliation instruction)	Downing: requested instructions were necessary to explain legal standards, stereotyping theory, and adverse inference for missing survey.	Abbott: pattern instructions and other given instructions sufficiently apprised the jury; no basis to infer bad‑faith spoliation.	Court: denial of proposed instructions not an abuse; given instructions and responses to jury questions were adequate; no spoliation instruction warranted absent evidence of bad faith.
Jowett testimony and mistrial motion (alleged "race‑baiting")	Downing: Abbott elicited testimony designed to appeal to juror sympathy for accused employees and improperly prejudiced the jury; counsel’s interrogation smeared witnesses and required a mistrial.	Abbott: testimony concerned Jowett’s firsthand assessments and an interrogatory that named him; questions were within bounds and any objection was not timely preserved.	Court: no abuse — much of objection was forfeited for lack of timely objection; testimony was relevant; mistrial denial proper.
Disparate‑impact claim (director hiring process)	Downing: subjective rating process disparately impacted African‑Americans (2 of 10 lowest were Black); statistical evidence supported a prima facie disparate‑impact case.	Abbott: only 10 applicants (small sample) — too few for meaningful statistical inference; plaintiff offered no valid statistical showing.	Court: affirmed summary judgment for Abbott — sample too small for disparate‑impact prima facie showing; disparate‑treatment evidence does not substitute.

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (establishes Daubert standard for admissibility of expert testimony)
Gopalratnam v. Hewlett‑Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771 (party bears burden to show expert meets Daubert/Rule 702)
Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co., 991 F.3d 865 (Rule 702 relevance and reliability analysis)
C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827 (district court as gatekeeper for expert evidence)
Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d 870 (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895 (pretext inquiry focuses on decisionmaker’s honest belief)
Williams v. Office of Chief Judge of Cook Cnty., 839 F.3d 617 (requirements for a valid comparator showing)
Barbera v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 906 F.3d 621 (comparator analysis and materially similar standard)
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (discussion of statistical evidence in Title VII context)
Vega v. Chicago Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996 (use of statistical comparisons to support disparate‑impact inferences)
Council 31, Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373 (small sample size precludes disparate‑impact inference)
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977 (limits on inferences from small/incomplete data sets in disparate‑impact claims)
Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 932 F.3d 513 (reversal requires error likely affected trial outcome)