Jaber v. Complete Payment Recovery Services, Inc.
1:22-cv-02689-HG
| E.D.N.Y | Aug 18, 2022Background
- Plaintiff Samir Jaber sued Complete Payment Recovery Services, Inc. in Queens Civil Court alleging FDCPA violations, New York GBL § 349 claims, and negligence based on two collection letters and sharing of his personal data with a mailing vendor.
- Letters: June 1 and June 26, 2021, both labeled "FIRST NOTICE" for the same $275.76 debt; Plaintiff alleged this could confuse the least sophisticated consumer about the 30-day dispute period.
- Plaintiff alleges Defendant uses a third‑party vendor to prepare/send letters and shared his personal identifying information with that vendor.
- Plaintiff seeks only statutory FDCPA damages (up to $1,000) and limited state-law damages within Queens Civil Court jurisdictional limits ($50,000). No actual damages for FDCPA claims are pleaded.
- Defendant removed to federal court asserting federal-question jurisdiction based on the FDCPA claim; Plaintiff moved to remand arguing lack of Article III standing post-TransUnion. The court treated pre‑motion letters as the remand motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing for FDCPA claim (concrete‑harm requirement) | Jaber: FDCPA allegations (mailing vendor disclosure; two "FIRST NOTICE" letters) suffice to confer concrete injury. | CPRS: Disclosure to mailing vendor and confusing duplicate "FIRST NOTICE" letters are concrete harms akin to private‑information disclosure recognized in TransUnion. | No standing: allegations do not show a concrete harm under TransUnion; mailing‑vendor theory and mere confusion/statutory violation are insufficient. |
| Supplemental or diversity jurisdiction over state law claims | Jaber: state claims can remain in federal court along with FDCPA claim. | CPRS: removal proper because of federal-question jurisdiction; alternatively state claims could meet diversity. | No supplemental jurisdiction because FDCPA claim lacks standing; diversity fails because plaintiff limited damages to <$50,000, below $75,000 threshold. |
| Mailing‑vendor theory as a basis for tort/invasion of privacy | Jaber: disclosure to vendor is a deceptive/unlawful practice and caused compensable harm. | CPRS: disclosure to vendor is not shown to be highly offensive or to have caused concrete injury; TransUnion cuts against this theory. | Rejected: courts in this district hold mailing‑vendor disclosures are de minimis and speculative, not a traditional concrete harm. |
| Award of fees/costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) | Jaber: seek costs and attorney’s fees for improper removal. | CPRS: removal was reasonable given post‑TransUnion uncertainty. | Denied: removal was objectively reasonable given evolving law after TransUnion; no unusual circumstances warrant fees. |
Key Cases Cited
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (Supreme Court 2021) (establishes concrete‑harm requirement for Article III standing)
- Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58 (2d Cir. 2021) (applies TransUnion concrete‑harm requirement to state‑law claims)
- Platinum‑Montaur Life Scis., LLC v. Navidea Biopharms., Inc., 943 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 2019) (removal statute construed narrowly; burden on removing party)
- Tantaros v. Fox News Network, LLC, 12 F.4th 135 (2d Cir. 2021) (removing defendant bears burden to establish federal jurisdiction)
- Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2014) (remand is proper remedy for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)
- In re FDCPA Mailing Vendor Cases, 551 F. Supp. 3d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (mailing‑vendor theory does not establish concrete injury; applied here)
- Cavazzini v. MRS Assocs., 574 F. Supp. 3d 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (remanded similar FDCPA claims relying on mailing‑vendor theory)