J v. a Minor, by her Mother and Next Best Friend, Anette H. Veldhuyzen v. Stafford County School Bd, 67 Va. App. 21

Background

J.V., a Stafford County student, was referred and evaluated for special education in 2013; the eligibility group found her eligible with primary classification intellectual disability but the parent disagreed with that classification.
The Eligibility Committee Summary form required a parent signature with options “I AGREE” or “I DO NOT AGREE”; the parent signed, crossed out “agree with” and wrote “acknowledge.”
The school issued a Prior Written Notice stating it interpreted the parent’s signature as consent to eligibility and convened an IEP team; the proposed IEP was offered October 25, 2013.
The parent requested a due process hearing challenging the adequacy of the IEP; on the eve of the hearing the School Board moved to dismiss, arguing the parent had not consented to eligibility.
The hearing officer dismissed the case, ruling the parent had not consented to the initial eligibility determination and therefore J.V. was not a “child with a disability” entitled to challenge the IEP; the circuit court affirmed and dismissed the civil action with prejudice.
The Court of Appeals reversed: it held Virginia’s parental-consent regulation cannot be read to bar a child from FAPE when a parent withholds or documents disagreement, and agreement is not required to constitute consent to eligibility.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a parent must "consent" (i.e., "agree") to an initial eligibility determination for the child to be a "child with a disability" and thereby challenge an IEP	J.V.: The IDEA and regulations do not permit parental refusal of eligibility to bar a child from FAPE; consent need not equal agreement and parent’s signature (even with disagreement noted) can constitute consent	School Board: Because parent crossed out “agree” and substituted “acknowledge,” she did not consent to eligibility; without consent the child is not a "child with a disability" and cannot challenge the IEP	Court: Reversed — parent need not agree to eligibility; refusal to agree cannot bar a child’s entitlement to FAPE; the parent’s signed form can be treated as consent and disagreement may be documented
Whether Virginia’s additional consent requirement (consent to initial eligibility) is consistent with federal IDEA regulations	J.V.: State may require additional consent only if refusal to consent does not deny FAPE; interpreting the rule to permit denial of FAPE conflicts with federal law and purpose	School Board/agency: State regulation requires written parental consent for initial eligibility, and lack of consent prevents the child from being treated as eligible	Court: State may require consent but cannot allow refusal to prevent provision of FAPE; regulation must be read to avoid conflict with federal law and to preserve the child’s right to FAPE
Whether the eligibility form’s wording (agree / do not agree) prevents a parent from consenting while dissenting	J.V.: The form permits consent even if parent documents disagreement; regulations distinguish “consent” from “agree” and require dissent statements to be preserved	School Board: Parent’s alteration shows she did not consent	Court: The regulatory scheme distinguishes consent from agreement; a parent may consent while also dissenting; the form’s boxes can both indicate consent provided signature present and dissent is recorded
Proper remedy and standard on remand	J.V.: Circuit court should conduct de novo civil review under Code § 22.1-214(D) and determine by preponderance whether the child is eligible and whether the IEP offers FAPE	School Board: (argued dismissal was proper)	Court: Reverse and remand; circuit court must treat case as independent civil action, receive administrative record, hear additional evidence if requested, and decide by preponderance whether IEP was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit

Key Cases Cited

Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (U.S. 1982) (two-part IDEA inquiry: procedures compliance and IEP reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit)
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (U.S. 2005) (parents can seek impartial due process hearing under IDEA)
G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003) (IEP is the primary vehicle for delivering FAPE)
Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir Cty. Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2000) (federal courts apply de novo review and may hear additional evidence in IDEA civil actions)
Newport News Sch. Bd. v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 460 (Va. 2010) (Virginia: IDEA-based actions are independent civil actions under Code § 22.1-214(D))
School Bd. of Campbell County v. Beasley, 238 Va. 44 (Va. 1989) (circuit court’s independent de novo role in IDEA civil actions)
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (U.S. 2009) (parents may obtain reimbursement when school fails to provide FAPE)
Butler v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 291 Va. 32 (Va. 2016) (avoid interpretations that produce internally inconsistent or absurd results)