983 F.3d 516
D.C. Cir.2020Background:
- V.T., a student with Autism Spectrum Disorder, had a 2016 IEP found inadequate by an April 2017 hearing officer, who ordered specific remedial provisions.
- An amended 2017 IEP (May 2017) set different provisions than parents requested (e.g., max class size 8, 4:1 student-to-adult ratio, a "quiet area" requirement); parents filed a due-process complaint challenging that IEP.
- An administrative hearing (Oct–Nov 2017) resulted in a November 27, 2017 HOD finding the 2017 IEP provided a FAPE; DCPS agreed to fund placement at the parents’ preferred private school for 2017–18.
- The parties and IEP team adopted a new 2018 IEP (July 2018) with different terms (e.g., max class size 6, a dedicated aide), to which all parties agreed.
- Parent J.T. sued in Feb 2018 seeking a declaration that the 2017 IEP was inadequate and an order to revise it (no request for retrospective relief); the district court dismissed as moot and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of challenge to 2017 IEP | A declaratory judgment remains effectual because prior IEPs inform future IEPs | 2017 IEP has been superseded; declaratory or prospective orders regarding it would have no effect because it no longer governs V.T. | Moot: challenge to an inoperative, fact-specific IEP provides no effective relief because parties agreed to a later IEP and no retrospective relief was sought |
| Voluntary-cessation exception | DCPS changed accommodations in a later IEP, so cessation was voluntary and litigation-driven | The 2017 IEP expired by operation of the IDEA’s annual-review requirement, not because DCPS ceased conduct due to suit | Not applicable: expiration resulted from statutory annual review, not unilateral cessation tied to litigation |
| "Capable of repetition but evading review" exception | IDEA placements are short-lived and likely to recur, so the issue can evade review | The dispute is fact-specific to the 2017 IEP and materially changes over time; future IEPs would present different factual contexts | Evading-review prong satisfied (short duration) but capable-of-repetition prong fails because the alleged wrong is fact-specific, not a recurring legal question |
| Merits / other asserted legal errors (burden of proof, ignoring provider recommendations) | Hearing officer misapplied burden and ignored providers; those legal errors are likely to recur | These arguments depend on the specific 2017 evidentiary record (e.g., lack of DCPS observations) and subsequent observations changed the factual record | Court did not reach a merits judgment because jurisdictional mootness forecloses relief; the claimed errors were fact-dependent and not shown to present recurring legal questions |
Key Cases Cited
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (U.S. 1988) (IDEA stay-put and recognition of recurring legal questions under IDEA)
- Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (U.S. 1985) (available IDEA remedies include prospective relief and tuition reimbursement)
- Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (mootness requires an ongoing controversy; limits on asserting broader injuries for mootness purposes)
- Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (IDEA one-year placements too short to litigate fully; recurring legal issues may survive mootness)
- Guedes v. ATF, 920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (voluntary-cessation doctrine inapplicable where cessation stems from factors beyond defendants’ unilateral authority)
- Nathan M. ex rel. Amanda M. v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 2, 942 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 2019) (fact-specific IEP challenges are moot when superseded by later IEPs)
- Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006) (declining to apply capable-of-repetition where IEP disputes are fact-specific and the child’s needs change)
- Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (determining FAPE requires a fact-intensive, child-specific inquiry)