J.R. Regula v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing
146 A.3d 836
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2016Background
- On March 9, 2015, Trooper Menet stopped Regula after observing lane crossings; he smelled alcohol, observed glassy/bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and staggered gait, and arrested Regula for DUI.
- At the hospital, Trooper Menet read the DL-26 implied-consent warnings; Regula signed the form but refused to allow blood draw, so the Department suspended his license for one year under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1).
- Regula appealed the suspension to the Court of Common Pleas; at the de novo hearing the Department presented the officer’s testimony and certified driving records; Regula did not testify.
- Regula sought to admit and have the court take judicial notice of the suppression order and dismissal in his parallel criminal DUI case (challenging the legality of the stop); common pleas excluded those materials as irrelevant and sustained the civil suspension.
- Regula argued on appeal that excluding the suppressed-criminal-evidence was an abuse of discretion and that the Implied Consent Law, as interpreted, violates the Fourth Amendment and Pa. Const. art. I, § 8 by permitting suspensions despite unlawful stops.
- The Commonwealth Court affirmed: evidence from the criminal proceeding is not relevant to the civil implied-consent suspension; precedent (notably Wysocki and progeny) forecloses applying the exclusionary rule or requiring a lawful stop in the civil suspension context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of suppression/dismissal from parallel criminal proceeding | Regula: the suppression/dismissal showing the stop was illegal is relevant and should be admitted to defeat the civil suspension | DOT: outcome of criminal proceedings is irrelevant to the civil implied-consent suspension; trial court has discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence | Court: affirmed exclusion — criminal-case suppression/dismissal is not relevant to the civil suspension and exclusion was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether a lawful stop is a prerequisite to Implied Consent suspension; constitutional challenge (Fourth Amendment & Pa. Const. art. I, § 8) | Regula: interpreting Implied Consent without requiring a lawful stop undermines Fourth Amendment protections and encourages arbitrary stops; constitutionally invalid in practice | DOT: established Pennsylvania precedent treats implied-consent suspensions as civil and not subject to the exclusionary rule; no constitutional defect requiring admission of suppressed criminal evidence | Court: acknowledged constitutional concerns but held itself bound by Supreme Court precedent; did not find Wysocki and later cases displaced — Implied Consent suspensions may stand even if stop later suppressed |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Wysocki, 535 A.2d 77 (Pa. 1987) (exclusionary rule in criminal trials does not bar civil license suspension for refusal; legality of stop generally irrelevant to suspension so long as officer had reasonable grounds to request test)
- Kachurak v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 913 A.2d 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (reaffirming that legality of DUI arrest/stop is not material to civil license suspension appeals)
- Zwibel v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 832 A.2d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (elements Department must prove at implied-consent appeal, including officer’s reasonable grounds to believe DUI)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (limiting states’ ability to criminalize refusal of blood tests; Supreme Court applies Fourth Amendment analysis to implied-consent contexts)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (exigent‑circumstances exception to warrant requirement in drunk‑driving blood draws cannot be applied categorically)