J.R. Jae v. Warden Harper, J.R. Jae v. Warden Harper

Background

Appellant John Richard Jae, incarcerated at SCI‑Forest, sued Allegheny County Jail officials, mailroom staff, Corizon Medical, and Allegheny County alleging multiple prison‑conditions violations (First, Eighth Amendments; ADA; RLUIPA; Rehabilitation Act) based on a May–June 2015 ACJ detention.
Allegations included denial/delay of mail and Cardizem heart medication, refusal to allow personal books, lack of library materials, denial of mattress/pillow, and inaccessible wheelchair showers.
Appellant filed to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP); the trial court granted IFP but later revoked it and dismissed the complaint under 42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(f) (the Pennsylvania "three‑strikes" provision) and dismissed specific claims under § 6602(e)(2).
Defendants argued Jae is an abusive litigator with prior state and federal dismissals; the trial court relied on prior dismissals to revoke IFP and summarily dismissed claims.
The Commonwealth Court affirmed revocation of IFP (Jae had previously been adjudicated an abusive litigator) but held the trial court erred by dismissing the entire complaint without first giving Jae an opportunity to pay filing fees and by dismissing certain claims that were sufficiently pleaded. The case was remanded with instructions to notify Jae of fees and allow payment time.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court properly revoked IFP under §6602(f) based on prior dismissals	Jae: only state‑court dismissals under §6602 count; federal §1915(g) dismissals irrelevant; he is not an abusive litigator for §6602(f)	Defs: Jae has prior state dismissals adjudicating him an abusive litigator; §6602(f) applies	Court: Affirmed revocation — Jae had been previously adjudicated an abusive litigator in Jae v. Good and §6602(f) applies
Whether complaint may be dismissed immediately after IFP revocation without offering opportunity to pay fees	Jae: revocation ends IFP but court must allow payment of fees before dismissal to preserve access to courts	Defs: dismissal proper given three‑strikes and alleged false IFP affidavit	Court: Reversed dismissal — trial court must provide list of fees and reasonable time to pay before dismissal under Lopez precedent
Adequacy of ADA claim re: wheelchair‑accessible showers when inmate assistance provided	Jae: reliance on inmate assistance does not necessarily foreclose ADA claim for meaningful access	Defs: Inmate assistance suffices (citing Mason) so no ADA violation	Court: Trial court erred to dismiss at pleading stage; Mason (visual impairment) not controlling for wheelchair cases; claim survives initial review
Whether Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference medical claim required certificate of merit (medical malpractice)	Jae: alleges deliberate indifference (Eighth Amendment) for denial of Cardizem, not medical malpractice	Defs (Corizon): claim is medical malpractice requiring certificate of merit	Court: Treated as Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, not malpractice; complaint sufficiently pleads denial of serious medical needs and survives dismissal at this stage

Key Cases Cited

Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d 802 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (affirming prior determination that Jae is an abusive litigator under §6602(f))
Lopez v. Haywood, 41 A.3d 184 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (prisoner whose IFP is revoked must be allowed to pay fees before dismissal to preserve access to courts)
Mason v. Correctional Medical Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880 (8th Cir.) (prisoner assistant may satisfy ADA access in context of visual impairment)
McCool v. Dep’t of Corr., 984 A.2d 565 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (distinguishable; court dismissed under §6602(e)(2) for failure to state a claim even if IFP never granted)
Kretchmar v. Dep’t of Corr., 831 A.2d 793 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (framework for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1994) (deliberate indifference standard: objective and subjective elements)