J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Appellant, v. DEL MAR PROPERTIES, L.P., Appellee, 443 S.W.3d 455

Del Mar Properties, L.P. purchased the El Paso property at a 2005 foreclosure sale following JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s judicial foreclosure action on a $40,000 deed of trust.
In April 2011 the trial court granted partial summary judgment for Del Mar, finding defects in notice, title identity, nullity of the sale, and failure of the corrected deed to pass title.
GMAC Mortgage Corporation filed for bankruptcy in May 2012 and removal of the state case to bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 was effected on November 16, 2012.
The state court non-suited GMAC the same day, a bench damages trial proceeded, and on November 19, 2012 a post-answer default judgment was entered against Appellant GMAC.
The United States Bankruptcy Court later remanded the cause to state court, after which this court held the removal divested state court of jurisdiction and the damages judgment was void; the remaining summary judgment on title was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable judgment.
The appellate court vacated the damages judgment, concluded Issue One was sustained, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether GMAC’s removal divested state court jurisdiction	Del Mar argues removal removed the entire action and state court lacked jurisdiction.	JPMorgan argues the scope and effect of removal were improper or incomplete due to lack of consent by all defendants.	Removal divested state court jurisdiction; damages judgment void.
Whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment on title after removal	Del Mar contends the title issue was adequately resolved by prior summary judgment.	JPMorgan maintains the title issue remained properly before the court, despite removal.	No final judgment; issue reviewable only if authorized; dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (timing of non-suit affects jurisdiction; pre-remand actions void)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (subject matter jurisdiction essential; de novo review)
Princess Louise Corp. v. Pac. Lighting Leasing Co. (In re Princess Louise Corp.), 77 B.R. 766 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (scope of removal includes entire action; certainty for courts)
Stewart Title Co. v. Street, 731 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987) (removal mechanics; jurisdictional reach preserved)
Henke Grain Co. v. Keenan, 658 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983) (remand after removal; jurisdiction revests upon remand)