J.N. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 43A04-1703-JV-613

In July 2016, then-17-year-old J.N. was accused of sexual contact with 8-year-old D.A.; a 9-year-old witness (B.R.) reported seeing oral sex in nearby woods.
Detective Todd Sautter interviewed J.N. and his mother at the sheriff’s department on July 12; an initial advice-of-rights form was signed, Detective left for ~2 minutes for private consultation, then returned and read a juvenile waiver form which J.N. and his mother executed.
J.N. made incriminating statements on videotape admitting oral sex occurred; a delinquency petition followed and a suppression hearing was held immediately before the fact-finding hearing.
J.N. moved to suppress the statement, arguing (1) the two-minute consultation was not a ‘‘meaningful’’ chance to consult as required by I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2)(C), and (2) the waiver was not knowing/voluntary because police did not inform them of the specific sexual-allegation nature prior to the waiver.
The juvenile court denied suppression, admitted the videotape at the fact-finding hearing, adjudicated J.N. delinquent for conduct equivalent to Level 3 felony child molesting, and placed him in the DOC boys’ school; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	State's Argument	J.N.'s Argument	Held
Whether mother and juvenile were afforded a "meaningful consultation" before parental waiver under I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2)(C)	Two-minute private consultation plus explicit inquiry by detective that they had talked satisfied the statute given surrounding circumstances	Two minutes was insufficient time to meaningfully consult before waiving rights	Affirmed: consultation was meaningful under the circumstances (mother testified they talked; detective ensured privacy and asked if they had talked)
Whether the parental/juvenile waiver was knowing and voluntary when police did not state the specific suspected delinquent act (child molesting) before obtaining the waiver	Totality of circumstances (age, understanding, lack of coercion, prior rumors about sexual activity) show waiver was knowing and voluntary despite lack of explicit statement	Failure to inform of the precise nature of the allegations rendered the waiver unknowing and involuntary	Affirmed: omission of explicit allegation is one nonexclusive factor; given other factors (juvenile age, mother’s awareness of rumors, lack of coercion), waiver was knowing and voluntary

D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 2011) (standard for reviewing juvenile waiver and suppression rulings; meaningful consultation requirement)
N.B. v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (custodial interrogation analysis for juveniles and effect on waiver requirements)
Estrada v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (factors for determining voluntariness of waiver and that failure to state specific allegation is not dispositive)
Tingle v. State, 632 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1994) (voluntariness principles cited regarding waivers)