J.L. v. Barnes
2011 Del. Super. LEXIS 269
| Del. Super. Ct. | 2011Background
- Plaintiff J.L. sues DYRS, DPBHS and related individuals for negligent and grossly negligent supervision leading to rape by a juvenile in state care.
- Defendants move to dismiss on res judicata, claim splitting, sovereign immunity and qualified immunity grounds.
- The District Court previously dismissed DYRS/DPBHS claims under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity without prejudice.
- This court converts the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment posture to evaluate outside-evidence issues.
- Court finds DYRS/DPBHS claims barred by sovereign immunity; plaintiff’s claims split across state and federal actions trigger stay; other grounds addressed but unresolved due to stay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Res judicata applicability | J.L. not barred; prior dismissal without prejudice prevents res judicata. | District Court finality and finality requirements bar relitigation. | Not barred; dismissal without prejudice does not preclude renewal. |
| Sovereign immunity waiver | State waived immunity via statutes or insurance coverage; discovery pending. | No waiver evidenced; STCA applicability; claims barred against state entities. | DYRS/DPBHS claims barred by sovereign immunity. |
| Qualified immunity for individual defendants | Ministerial duties and mandatory policies may defeat immunity; discovery needed. | Actions were discretionary; immunity applies unless bad faith or gross negligence proven. | Issue unresolved; discovery needed to determine discretionary vs. ministerial acts and bad faith/gross negligence. |
| Public duty / state created danger | State created danger theory may impose duty due to interactions with school staff. | Public duty doctrine bars claims unless discretionary acts and specific criteria met; state created danger not sufficiently developed. | Public duty doctrine supports dismissal of discretionary-act claims; state created danger not addressed further due to stay. |
| Claim splitting | Different defendants in separate actions do not trigger splitting as to same parties. | Indistinguishable transactional facts; two suits constitute improper split. | Plaintiff impermissibly split claims; stay of this action in favor of District Court action. |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. Cal. Dept. of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2007) (court discretion in dismissing or staying for proper claim-splitting remedy)
- Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2002) (standard for discretionary vs ministerial actions; qualified immunity context)
- Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court 1998) (limited discovery may be necessary to resolve qualified immunity)
- Johnson v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 723 A.2d 1200 (Del. Super. 1998) (sovereign immunity limitations and state claims)
- Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980) (implications for pendent and related state claims in federal proceedings)
- Wyatt v. Krzysiak, 82 F.Supp.2d 250 (D. Del. 1999) (state-created danger doctrine discussion in due process context)
- Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467 (Del. 1962) (Delaware appellate treatment of summary judgment and evidence)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (Supreme Court 1986) (summary judgment standard and burden shifting)
- Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d 1175 (Del. 1985) (Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity principles in Delaware context)